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THE INEQUALITIES OF INNOVATION
Colleen V. Chien*
ABSTRACT
Over the last few decades, the United States has become more innovative,
but the gains have been distributed unequally. In 2020, over 50% of new U.S.
patents went to the top 1% of patentees, and more than 50% of all patents of
U.S. origin were generated by just five states, all coastal. Less than 13% of
inventors were women. The economic, geographic, and demographic
concentration of innovation highlight how the intersections between two
traditionally discrete topics—innovation and inequality—have become
increasingly relevant. But rather than any single inequality, this Article argues,
multiple inequalities—of income, opportunity, and access—have relevance to
innovation. Examining the inequalities of innovation, separately and together,
exposes the tensions, at times surprising, between notions of equity. When
mapped onto patent law, an inequalities framework also reveals how patent law
can exacerbate inequality by providing enhanced returns to “invention
capital”—the role models, trust, know-how, and networks required to take
advantage of inventing. But an inequalities framework also shows how patented
innovation can improve conditions for the worst-off, by providing paths to
prosperity and hastening the creation and diffusion of innovation across classes,
even as it makes the rich richer.
Building on the “inequalities” framework described above, this Article
offers a set of legal and administrative proposals grounded in patent law for
addressing inequality concerns. To ensure equal opportunities to participate,
this Article proposes the creation of an Independent Office of the Small Inventor
Advocate, akin to the National Taxpayer Advocate, that would have
responsibility for outreaching to and increasing invention capital and know-how
among first-time, underrepresented, and under-resourced inventors, and
leveling up the inventing playing field, for example through universally
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accessible patent-quality technology. To expand access to innovation through
partnerships and expand public understanding and oversight of the patent
system, by other agencies, for example, this Article proposes the introduction of
an independent Office of Public Interest and Partnerships in Innovation.
Finally, introducing and centering equity metrics, like the number of first-time
innovators and gaps in the rates, can support equitable growth in innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 21, 2021, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(“CDC”) reported two grim milestones: nearly twenty-five million cases of
COVID-19 and over 400,000 deaths in the United States.1 Days earlier, another
federal agency, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), released data
showing that, despite a global recession due to the pandemic and record
unemployment,2 published patent applications had reached an all-time high.3
Increased reliance on vaccines, tests, and technology put intellectual propertyintensive industries on the upward-sloping part of the “K-shaped recovery
curve,” the divided path of the economic recovery.4 While many tech workers
were told they could work from home indefinitely,5 thousands of small
businesses closed permanently.6
What is the connection between inequality, innovation, and patents?
Distributional questions like this have historically received scant attention, for a
few reasons.7 First, the purpose of the patent system is, as stated in the U.S.

1
COVID Data Tracker, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trends_totaldeaths_totalcasesper100k (last visited Aug. 16, 2021).
2
Unemployment Rate Rises to Record High 14.7 Percent in April 2020, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.
(May 13, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2020/unemployment-rate-rises-to-record-high-14-point-7percent-in-april-2020.htm.
3
2020 Trends and Insights, IFI CLAIMS PAT. SERVS., https://www.ificlaims.com/rankings-trends2020.htm#title__9 (last visited Feb. 3, 2021) (reporting a slight rise of about 20,000 published applications in
2020 over 2019 and slight decline among grants of 2,000).
4
Kariappa Bheemaiah, Mark Esposito & Terence Tse, Are We Experiencing a K-shaped Recovery from
COVID-19?, WORLD ECON. F. (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/12/k-shaped-covid19coronavirus-recovery/.
5
Emily Courtney, 25 Companies Switching to Permanent Remote Work, FLEXJOBS,
https://www.flexjobs.com/blog/post/companies-switching-remote-work-long-term/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2021)
(chronicling the early decisions of Twitter, Facebook, and others to offer long-term remote work).
6
Anne Sraders & Lance Lambert, Nearly 100,000 Establishments that Temporarily Shut Down Due to
the Pandemic Are Now Out of Business, FORTUNE (Sept. 28, 2020, 10:25 AM),
https://fortune.com/2020/09/28/covid-buisnesses-shut-down-closed/ (reporting nearly 100,000 business
closures).
7
Subject to a few notable exceptions, including the scholarship cited in Parts II and III and writings on
international access to medicines. See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Crowdsourced Bibliography on IP and
Distributive
Justice,
WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION
(Jan.
20,
2018),
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Constitution, to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”8 As such,
the U.S. patent system is “unashamedly utilitarian.”9 Second, distributional
concerns have traditionally been the domain of public law.10 Within what Martha
McCluskey has called the “maximization first and redistribution second” 11
division in law, the role of patent law, it would seem, is simply to encourage
maximal innovation. Finally, while the literature regarding the relationship
between technology and inequality is vast,12 little of it has considered the role of
the law.13
But who gets to benefit from and participate in innovation has increasingly
been the subject of heated debate. That an estimated one-third of uninsured
Americans do not take their medications as prescribed because of cost 14 has led
lawmakers to call for the use of reforms to both “take back” drug patents15 and
reform practices that may be contributing to their unwarranted issuance in the

https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2018/01/crowdsourced-bibliography-on-ip-and.html. For the particular
trope of patenting as an important pathway for the American dream, see generally Ryan T. Holthe, Trolls or
Great Inventors: Case Studies of Patent Assertion Entities, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2014). I thank Michael Risch
for reminding me of this point.
8
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9
Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 546 (2003).
10
See Richard A. Epstein, Innovation and Inequality: The Separability Thesis, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 10–13 (2016) (arguing for a strict division between promoting innovation and redistributing wealth).
But see Jedediah Britton-Purdy, Amy Kapczynski & David Singh Grewal, Law and Political Economy: Toward
a Manifesto, LAW & POL. ECON. PROJECT (Nov. 6, 2017), https://lpeblog.org/2017/11/06/law-and-politicaleconomy-toward-a-manifesto (describing and acknowledging the shortcomings created by the “implicit divide
between ‘public’ and ‘private’ fields of law”). In Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group,
LLC, the Supreme Court recently confirmed that patents, which confer rights to exclude others from the practice
of an invention, are “public franchises” rather than private property. 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018).
11
Martha McCluskey, Against the Economic Pie: How “Redistribution” Limits Political Economic
Analysis, LAW & POL. ECON. PROJECT (Mar. 27, 2019), https://lpeproject.org/blog/against-the-economic-piehow-redistribution-limits-political-economic-analysis/.
12
See generally Daron Acemoglu, Technological Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market, 40 J. ECON.
LIT. 7, 12–16 (2002) (providing a literature review on inequality and technological change).
13
See KATHARINA PISTOR, THE C ODE OF C APITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND I NEQUALITY
3 (2019).
14
ROBIN A. COHEN, PETER BOERSMA & ANJEL VAHRATIAN, STRATEGIES USED BY ADULTS AGED 18–64
TO REDUCE THEIR PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS, 2017 at 3 (2019), https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/76621.
15
Valerie Bauman, Democrats Tout Federal Patent Take-Backs for Lowering Drug Costs, BLOOMBERG
L. (Dec. 16, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/democrats-tout-federal-patenttake-backs-for-lowering-drug-costs.
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first place.16 Starkly unequal access to COVID-19 vaccines17 has led to the
unprecedented approval by the World Trade Organization of a partial vaccine
patent waiver to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.18
Those who seek to reduce inequality tend to focus on welfare policies like
tax and education. Though patent law may not seem like a natural extension, this
Article offers a framework for understanding the intersections between
innovation and inequality and suggests how patent policy can help address
distributional concerns. Using the patent system as a lever to tackle inequality
yields two unique benefits. First, as a form of innovation policy, patent law can
spur the development and dissemination of new technologies that raise
productivity and real wealth for everyone, thereby avoiding the zero-sum game
of redistributing existing wealth. As such, this Article’s prescriptions primarily
aim to level up, and not just level, the playing field. Second, an inequalities lens
can improve patent law by revealing the mechanisms by which the law both
exacerbates and alleviates inequality, in particular through what I call “invention
capital”—the trust, resources, know-how, and network of people needed to take
advantage of the patent system. This Article calls for more attention to be paid
to growing invention capital, in service of spurring innovation that is responsive
to the needs of a wider population.
Part I describes a framework for understanding inequality and innovation,
centered on the unbraiding of the concept of inequality into three distinct
inequalities—economic inequality, inequality of opportunity, and inequality of
access. Doing so highlights surprising contrasts: for example, equality of
opportunity to innovate, but also some amount of economic inequality—which
supports risk-taking and racing for profits—both foster innovation. Through the
lens of three illustrative inventions from 1900 to the present, this Part explores
the tensions among and between the inequalities of innovation.

16
See, e.g., Letter from Patrick Leahy, John Cornyn, Richard Blumenthal, Susan M. Collins, Amy
Klobuchar & Mike Braun, U.S. Senators, to Kathi Vidal, Director, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. (June 8, 2022)
(asking the USPTO to issue a rule of proposed rulemaking or public request for comments regarding the
contribution of a patenting practices like “terminal disclaimers” and “continuation patent” filing to poor-quality
patents).
17
Anna Rouw, Jennifer Kates, Adam Wexler & Josh Michaud, Tracking Global COVID-19 Vaccine
Equity: An Update, KFF (Sept. 22, 2021), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/trackingglobal-covid-19-vaccine-equity-an-update/ (reporting a COVID vaccination rate in Africa of less than 5% versus
nearly 70% in richer regions of the world as of September 2021).
18
See World Trade Organization, Draft Ministerial Decision on the Trips Agreement, WTO Doc.
WT/Min(22)/W/15/Rev.2 (2022) (giving express permission to member countries to authorize the use of patents
required for the production and supply of COVID-19 vaccines without consultation with the rights holder,
subject to limited conditions).
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Part II uses the patent system as a case study for understanding how the law
intensifies as well as alleviates the inequalities of innovation, contributing to the
dynamics identified in Part I. A review of the ways in which patent law intersects
with each of the inequalities of innovation underscores the importance of
“invention capital”—the role models, trust, know-how, and network needed to
take advantage of invention—for ensuring broad opportunity to innovate.
However, it also reveals that equality of opportunity and equality of access to
innovation are both limited by the system’s opacity, lack of meaningful public
oversight and public understanding, and structural factors.
Part III builds upon Part II to suggest ways that the patent system can address
the inequalities of innovation. First, to safeguard equal opportunity to participate
in invention, it proposes creating an office focused on outreach, the Office of the
Small Inventor Advocate—modeled after other such offices in federal
agencies—responsible for increasing invention capital and know-how among
underrepresented and first-time inventors, and leveling up the playing field—for
example, through patent-quality technology. Second, to expand access to
innovation, it proposes establishing an Independent Office of the Public Interest
and Partnerships focused on advancing public understanding of the patent
system, particularly by other public agencies, and fostering technology
transactions and partnerships that can expand access to innovation. Third, it
proposes the introduction and systematic reporting of innovation equity metrics
for measuring and tracking, for example, first-time inventing, to track progress
toward narrowing the inequalities of innovation.
I.

THE INEQUALITIES OF INNOVATION

Over the last several decades, the United States has become more innovative,
but the gains have been distributed unequally. From 1980–2017, the number of
yearly U.S.-origin patent grants grew about seven times faster than the
population.19 The wealth of the top one percent of households also grew, from
24% in 1980 to 43% in 2012.20 Less well-known, patent holdings became

19
U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963–2020, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (May 2021),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (showing growth in U.S. yearly patent grants
from 37,000 to 150,000, or 300%); see also United States Population, WORLDOMETER,
https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/us-population/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2021) (showing growth
in U.S. population from 229M to 325M, or 42%).
20
Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from
Capitalized Income Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 553 (2016). But see, e.g., Gerald Auten & David Splinter, Income
Inequality in the United States: Using Tax Data to Measure Long-Term Trends 1, 2–4 (Feb. 18, 2022),
http://davidsplinter.com/AutenSplinter-Tax_Data_and_Inequality.pdf (challenging findings of dramatic
inequality growth by Saez and Zucman and, based on taking into account income not reported on tax data and
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substantially more concentrated, according to an analysis I performed for this
paper—by 2020, more than half of newly granted patents went to the top 1% of
patentees, and over three-quarters to the top 10%, up from 39% and 64%,
respectively.21 Five states, all coastal, captured over 50% of all U.S. patents. 22
Women accounted for only 12.8% of inventors on 2019 U.S.-origin patents.23
But while rising inequality has been called the “defining issue of our time,”24
multiple inequalities are relevant when it comes to innovation. The idea of
distinct equalities is not new. The claim that all “should have the same” begs the
questions “of what?” and “among whom?”25 Philosophers have long wrestled
with whether fairness requires equality of resources, happiness, or capabilities
to do or be what they choose,26 or something else. In the law, civil procedure
rules embody formal equality in form (e.g., everyone pays the same fee to file a
complaint), but risk substantive inequality in substance (e.g., that everyone pays
the same means some will be priced out).27
When it comes to innovation, at least three types of inequality matter: (1)
inequality of wealth/income, regarding the distribution of economic resources;
(2) inequality of opportunity to innovate, which pertains to the production of
innovation; (3) and inequality of access to innovation, about the affordability
and availability of innovation. Unlike interventions that primarily seek to
redistribute existing resources, innovation interventions, because they are about
new and better ways of doing things, are generally distinguishable by the way

changes in the marriage rate, finding more modest increases in inequality).
21
The precise numbers depend on the data source. See infra Appendix Figures 1A, 1B (showing the
share of grants going to the top 1% and 10% of U.S. patentees in 2020, using Google Patents and PatentsView
data sources, respectively).
22
Analysis is based on 2020 patents by state and population by state. Patent Counts by Origin and Type
Calendar
Year
2020,
U.S.
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/st_co_20.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2021); US States–Ranked
by Population 2021, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.com/states (last visited Aug. 16,
2021). The states with the most patents are California, Texas, New York, Washington, and Massachusetts. Patent
Counts by Origin and Type Calendar Year 2020, supra.
23
ANDREW A. TOOLE, CHARLES A. W. DEGRAZIA, FRANCESCO LISSONI, MICHELLE J. SAKSENA,
KATHERINE P. BLACK, ERNEST MIGUELEZ & GIANLUCA TARASCONI, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PROGRESS
AND
POTENTIAL: 2020 UPDATE ON U.S. WOMEN INVENTOR-PATENTEES 1, 2 (2020),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCE-DH-Progress-Potential-2020.pdf.
24
Robert L. Borosage, Inequality is Still the Defining Issue of Our Time, NATION (Oct. 12, 2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/inequality-is-still-the-defining-issue-of-our-time/.
25
Stefan Gosepath, Equality, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equality/#EquWel
(Apr. 26, 2021).
26
Norman Daniels, Equality of What: Welfare, Resources, or Capabilities?, 50 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL R SCH. 273, 273–74 (1990).
27
Paul Stancil, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1633, 1635–37 (2017).
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they dynamically extend available resources.28 That is to say: they sound in
abundance, not scarcity.
This Part begins with a discussion of each type of inequality and how it
intersects with innovation. It then explores the inequalities of innovation through
the lens of three innovations, each selected to typify a major era of inventing
from the 1900s to the present: a mechanical invention from the early 1900s
(steam engine technology); a pharmaceutical invention discovered in the 1960s
(naloxone); and a digital invention from the 2010s (database automation). This
exploration is not without risk: dissecting “inequality” into multiple inequalities
risks decontextualization, promotion of a false moral equivalence, and a failure
to holistically consider the causal relationships between types of inequalities. To
attempt to avoid such siloing, this Part concludes with a discussion of the
inequalities together.
A. The Three Inequalities of Innovation
The paragraphs below dissect the concept of “inequality” into the three
distinct inequalities—of wealth/income, of opportunity to innovate, and of
access to innovation—with relevance to innovation, and discuss some of the
more salient dimensions of each.
1. Inequality of Wealth/Income
Economic inequality encompasses the gap in income or wealth between rich
and poor households,29 and the corresponding differences in the best- and worstoff firms.30 How, if at all, does economic inequality relate to innovation? Though
modern accounts stress inequality’s downsides,31 inequality has been associated
with several potential upsides when it comes to innovation. In A Theory of
Justice, John Rawls describes how to cultivate a fair and just society.32

28

Digital goods perhaps exemplify the abundance paradigm best. See Seth G. Benzell & Erik
Brynjolfsson, Digital Abundance and Scarce Genius: Implications for Wages, Interest Rates, and Growth 5
(Nat’l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Rsch.,
Working
Paper
No.
25585,
2019),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25585/w25585.pdf (characterizing digital versions of
labor and capital as increasing the supply of and reducing the marginal cost of both labor and capital).
29
Saez & Zucman, supra note 20, at 520, 573–75.
30
See Jae Song, David J. Price, Faith Guvenen, Nicholas Bloom & Till von Wachter, Firming Up
Inequality, 134 Q.J. ECON. 1, 3–4 (2019) (tracing income inequality primarily to the differences between firms,
rather than within firms).
31
See, e.g., Christopher Ingraham, How Rising Inequality Hurts Everyone, Even the Rich, WASH. POST
(Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/02/06/how-rising-inequality-hurtseveryone-even-the-rich/.
32
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 42–43 (Erin Kelly ed., Belknap Press 2001)
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According to his famous “Difference Principle,” social and economic
inequalities should be arranged “to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged
members of society.”33 That is to say, some level of economic inequality is
tolerable, though only when it is “to the greatest benefit” of the worst-off. In the
spirit of Winston Churchill’s statement, “[t]he inherent vice of capitalism is the
unequal sharing of blessings. The inherent virtue of Socialism is the equal
sharing of miseries,”34 innovation may be a blessing whose unequal distribution
just may be worth it.
How might income inequality benefit the worst-off vis-á-vis innovation? In
“Common Sense of Progress,” Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek explores a
few ways.35 First, rich people and firms have rents in excess of others that can
be used to underwrite innovations that will eventually benefit all.36 Using prizes,
direct funds, and other means, philanthropists have catalyzed breakthroughs in
a variety of disease areas, including HIV/AIDS and cystic fibrosis. 37 Research
firm Bell Labs has led the world in “corporate” Nobel Prizes, 38 and pioneered
the laser, transistor, and solar cell, among other key inventions. 39 Second, the
desire for novelties (e.g., space exploration) supports discoveries from which
subsequent innovators and the public can learn.40 Today’s tech billionaires,
many of them self-made, suggest the third, and perhaps most universal,
mechanism by which inequality spurs innovation: the promise of riches
incentivizes talented people to innovate. When innovative people and firms race
(citing JOHN R AWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE §§ 11–14 (Belknap Press 1971)).
33
Id.
34
Vice of Capitalism, INT’L CHURCHILL SOC’Y, https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/quotes/vice-ofcapitalism/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2021).
35
See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, CHAPTER 2: THE C OMMON SENSE OF
PROGRESS 39–53 (1960).
36
Id. at 44 (“If today . . . the relatively poor can have a car[,] . . . this was made possible because in the
past others with larger incomes were able to spend on what was then a luxury.”).
37
Gabriel Kasper & Justin Marcoux, The Re-Emerging Art of Funding Innovation, 12 STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV. 28, 28, 30–31 (2014); see William J. Broad, Billionaires with Big Ideas Are Privatizing
American Science, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/science/billionaireswith-big-ideas-are-privatizing-american-science.html (describing donations to disease research based on
personal experiences). But see Nicholas Lemann, Would the World Be Better Off Without Philanthropists?, NEW
YORKER (May 23, 2022), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/05/30/would-the-world-be-better-offwithout-philanthropists-paul-vallely-emma-saunders-hastings (summarizing books recounting the familiar
critiques of philanthropy as unaccountable, anti-democratic, and inequitable).
38
Karina Cummings, Nobel Science Prizes in Industry: The Promise and the Challenge of Science in the
“Real World”, https://www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/physics/brau/H182/Term%20papers%20’02/Karina.htm (last
visited Aug. 16, 2021). I thank Brian Love for making this point to me.
39
Awards, NOKIA BELL LABS, https://www.bell-labs.com/about/awards/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2022).
40
HAYEK, supra note 35, at 45 (“[T]he rich, by experimenting with new styles of living . . . perform a
necessary service without which the advance of the poor would be very much slower . . . .”).
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for rents, technological progress, whether patented or not, is accelerated.
Incentives are thus a double-edged sword: they motivate innovation, but by
giving larger rewards for more innovative ideas, they also imply unequal
economic outcomes and contribute to inequality.
In these ways, economic inequality, which is often perceived as the problem,
seems to be an important part of the solution with respect to innovation. The
desire to get ahead motivates productive effort and lures talent, creating
productive clusters. The resulting innovation, at times underwritten or driven
initially by those who are ahead, benefits the rich but, the hope is, also everyone
else eventually. As explored in Part II, intellectual property intensifies this
market-based dynamic by increasing the rewards to certain forms of innovation
through exclusion. According to Robert Merges, the inequality that intellectual
property contributes to is a “justifiable form of inequality,” because it provides
significant benefits to the “least advantaged,” as identified by Rawls. 41
Innovation not only is spurred by inequality, but even without explicitly
intending to, it can also make even the worst-off wealthier through abundance.
Consistent with the “Difference Principle,” a smaller share of a very large pie in
many cases may be preferable to an equal share of a much smaller pie.
But how much inequality is the right amount? If too little inequality is
dangerous, too much is even more so because there is little reason to exert effort
when the outcomes are already set.42 And yet, some advocate for giving
innovators that are the furthest ahead even more (intellectual property)
protection because doing so will motivate those within striking distance to put
more effort in.43
Related to the question of whether economic inequality hastens or stunts
innovation is the question of how the gains from innovation are shared between
capital and labor. This question is as timely now, during the “fourth” Industrial
Revolution, of artificial intelligence and robotics,44 as it was during the “first”
Industrial Revolution, when mechanized production was first introduced and the
41

ROBERT MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 117–20 (2011).
See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, Is Economic Inequality Really a Problem?, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/opinion/economic-inequality-moral-philosophy.html?auth=logingoogle.
43
Daron Acemoglu & Ufuk Akcigit, State-Dependent Intellectual Property Rights Policy 34 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 12775, 2006) (“Contrary to a naive intuition, we find that the growthmaximizing IPR policy provides greater protection to firms that are further ahead of their rivals than those that
are technologically close to their competitors.”).
44
Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: What it Means, How to Respond, WORLD ECON. F.
(Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-andhow-to-respond/ (describing the fourth Industrial Revolution).
42
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so-called “machinery question” was first posited.45 As British economist David
Ricardo observed then, machines can make workers more productive, but they
can also, over time, replace them and depress wages.46 Ricardo’s answer to
concerns about the impact of technology on labor was a warning that “the
substitution of machinery for human labour [sic] is often very injurious to the
interests of the class of labourers [sic].”47 But, as described in further detail
below, technological innovation often impacts the demand for workers of
different skills differently,48 with a range of implications for economic
inequality.
2. Inequality of Opportunity to Innovate
Related to but distinct from economic inequality is the principle of inequality
of opportunity.49 Equality of opportunity to innovate means giving all a fair
chance to participate in and profit from innovation, patented or not. Also known
as “starting gate” or “level playing field” equality,50 the strong version of equal
opportunity demands, Rawls has said, that “offices and positions” be “open to
all,” regardless of background.51 As the Supreme Court has said, the Constitution
requires “equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to
society based on . . . individual talents and capacities.”52 Like expanding
innovation, boosting equality of opportunity should grow the pie through the
development and more productive allocation of talent. Equality of opportunity
to innovate has long been an ideal (if not always a reality) of the U.S. patent
system53 and related innovation policies.54 But if equal opportunity means that
everyone in theory has an equal chance, it doesn’t necessarily follow that
everyone will take that chance. Equal opportunity can still lead to unequal
45
DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 283 (Batoche Books
2001) (1817).
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
See infra Section I.C.3 for a discussion contrasting technologies that are skills-biased (e.g.,
automation) versus unskilled-biased (e.g., steam power).
49
John E. Roemer & Alain Trannoy, Equality of Opportunity 1 (Cowles Found., Working Paper No.
1921, 2013) (“[T]he development of egalitarian theory . . . may be characterized as an effort to replace equality
of outcomes with equality of opportunities.”).
50
Id.
51
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 33, at 42 (describing the so-called “offices and positions
open to all”).
52
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
53
Colleen Chien, SUCCESS Act Testimony, SANTA CLARA UNIV. SCH. L. 1, 2 (June 30, 2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SUCCESSAct-Chien.pdf (describing features of the early
U.S. patent system that were meant to encourage inclusion).
54
See infra Section III.A.
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outcomes if there are differences in endowments, motivation, or both.
Also, if easy to agree upon in principle, equality of opportunity to innovate
is hard to measure in practice.55 For example, the extreme underrepresentation
of women among inventors56 reflects historical and structural factors such as
institutional discrimination, limited educational opportunities, and inadequate
access to capital.57 However, unequal participation in innovation more generally
may also be due in part to girls selecting out of STEM classes, 58 women having
stronger comparative advantages in reading and non-STEM fields,59 or
differences in preferences60—factors that are hard to tease apart. Brian May was
completing his PhD in astrophysics when he decided to take a break and pursue
a musical career with the band Queen,61 a personal, highly successful choice.
But if a woman gets pregnant during her STEM PhD program and “chooses” to
take a hiatus to avoid “juggling chainsaws and eating a hamburger while riding
a unicycle,” as having a baby while getting a doctorate has been described,62 did
she really have a choice in the first place? In addition, even if equal opportunity
matters more than equal participation, the two are related, since the historic lack
of equal opportunity creates structural hurdles to future participation. 63

55
The difficulty stands in contrast to equality of opportunity in general, which can be approximated by
socioeconomic mobility.
56
Cf. ANDRE IANCU & LAURA A. PETER, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., REPORT TO CONGRESS
PURSUANT TO P.L. 115-273, THE SUCCESS ACT, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 18–20 (2019) (reporting that
women make less than 13% of inventors on U.S. patents); Tara Law, Women Are Now the Majority of the U.S.
Workforce—But Working Women Still Face Serious Challenges, TIME (Jan. 16, 2020, 4:55 PM),
https://time.com/5766787/women-workforce/ (documenting that women represent just over 50% of the
workforce).
57
See REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO P.L. 115-273, supra note 56, at 18–20. Both types of factors
are described in Part II, the latter in the context of invention capital.
58
CATHERINE HILL, CHRISTIANNE CORBETT & ANDRESSE ST. ROSE, AAUW, WHY SO FEW? WOMEN IN
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS 92 (2010), https://time.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/05/why-so-few-women-in-science-technology-engineering-and-mathematics.pdf.
59
See Gijsbert Stoet & David C. Geary, The Gender-Equality Paradox in Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Mathematics Education, 29 PSYCH. SCI. 581, 585 (2018).
60
See Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 283,
293 (1981) (contrasting “[b]rute luck” with “[o]ption luck,” which involves some element of choice).
61
Brian May Biography, BIOGRAPHY (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.biography.com/musician/brian-may.
62
Megan Woolhouse, Pregnant and Pursuing a PhD, the Ultimate Juggling Act, BU TODAY (May 15,
2019), http://www.bu.edu/articles/2019/pregnant-and-phd/.
63
See Isabel V. Sawhill, Still the Land of Opportunity?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 1, 1999),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/still-the-land-of-opportunity (noting that participation is historically limited
by multiple factors such as education, social origins, and family background).
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3. Inequality of Access to Innovation: Affordability and Availability
A final form of inequality with relevance to innovation is inequality of
access—differences in the ability of the rich and poor, the urban and rural to
access innovation. In international health contexts, access has been defined as
“the timely use of services according to needs” and includes the dimensions of
“geographical and financial accessibility, availability, acceptability and
quality.”64 This Article specifically distinguishes the affordability of an
innovation (e.g., is it priced within reach?) from its availability—for example,
within a particular geography and in a form suitable for the particular needs of
diverse consumers (e.g., with respect to a drug innovation, does an appropriate
formulation even exist, and is it available to consumers that need them?). 65
Although related to economic inequality, inequality of access 66 arguably better
measures welfare and happiness, because what one can afford and what solutions
are available in the first place matter more than how much money is in one’s
bank account.67
Along the affordability dimension, whether “equality of access” extends to
a particular good depends on its nature as being either essential or nonessential.
According to Rawls, essential goods are goods that every rational human is
presumed to value, including “rights and liberties, powers and opportunities,
income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect.”68 These include
essential medicines that “satisfy the priority health care needs of the
population.”69 Margaret Chon has called for “substantive equality”—equal

64
Maryam Bigdeli, Bart Jacobs, Goran Tomson, Richard Laing, Abdul Ghaffar, Bruno Dujardin & Wim
Van Damme, Access to Medicines from a Health System Perspective, 28 HEALTH POL’Y & PLAN. 692, 693
(2013) (quoting David H. Peters et al., Poverty and Access to Health Care in Developing Countries, 1136
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIS. 161, 162 (2008)).
65
Veronika J. Wirtz & Corrina Moucheraud, Beyond Availability and Affordability: How Access to
Medicines Affects Non-Communicable Disease Outcomes, 2 LANCET PUB. HEALTH 390, 390–91 (2017)
(discussing the twin challenges of availability and affordability).
66
Inequality of access to innovation could be considered a form of “consumption inequality.” Orazio P.
Attanasio & Luigi Pistaferri, Consumption Inequality, 30 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 3–4 (2016).
67
Id. at 4 (“[R]esearchers interested in measuring inequality in well-being need to go beyond the fact
that consumption is unequally distributed . . . .”).
68
Original Position, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA of PHILOSOPHY (rev. Apr. 3, 2019),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/original-position; see also Amartya Sen, Drummond
Professor of Pol. Econ., Oxford Univ., The Tanner Lecture on Human Values: Equality of What?, 213–14 (May
22, 1979) (transcript available at http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Sen-1979_Equality-of-What.pdf)
(“[Primary social goods] are ‘things that every rational man is presumed to want,’ including ‘rights, liberties and
opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect.’”).
69
The WHO Model List of Essential Medicines for Children, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/initiatives/gap-f/our-portfolio/essential-medicines (last visited June 29, 2021).
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access to information, ideas, and goods that serve basic needs. 70 As she imagines
it, such equality would require strict scrutiny of intellectual property grants (as
well as interventions that would limit exclusions) that limit access to such
goods.71 But while there is a greater commitment to equal access to lifesaving
drugs like vaccines than to nonessential “lifestyle-enhancing” drugs like erectile
dysfunction treatment, distinguishing between an innovation want and an
innovation can be difficult.72
But despite the dominance of affordability concerns in the public mind when
it comes to access to innovation, availability, not just affordability, matters to
access. While the often eye-popping prices of pharmaceutical drugs provide a
steady diet of headlines,73 the instability of generic supply or the lack of an
appropriate formulation or medicine in the first place also present real
obstacles.74 Companies are reluctant to invest in products for which profit
margins are likely to be low. One factor impacting availability, then, depends on
the extent to which the market for an innovation is divided. While innovation
trickle-down is somewhat suited for “crossover” conditions like COVID-19 and
HIV/AIDS, which impact large numbers of patients across many countries, other
conditions are split along patient and profitability lines. Neglected diseases like
tuberculosis afflict a large but poor swath of people living in developing
countries.75 Particular geographic and demographic needs—for example,
effective COVID-19 vaccines that do not require a cold chain or pediatric
formulations for HIV drugs appropriate for infants and children76—are also
underserved by traditional innovation processes. When an innovation need is
70
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2885,
2894–95 (2006).
71
Id. at 2885.
72
While some might even argue access to Viagra is necessary, not just helpful, most would probably
agree that high-speed internet access, for example, has already become essential. See Tom Wheeler, 5 Steps to
Get the Internet to All Americans, BROOKINGS (May 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/5-steps-toget-the-internet-to-all-americans/ (describing high-speed internet access as “no longer ‘nice to have,’ [but]
critical”).
73
See, e.g., Ron Wyden, Let Medicare Negotiate Lower Drug Prices, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 25, 2021),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/10/25/opinion/let-medicare-negotiate-lower-drug-prices/
(describing
“headline-grabbing drugs at outrageous prices,” such as the $56,000 per year cost of Alzheimer drug Aduhelm,
despite “limited evidence of its effectiveness”).
74
Difficulty of access to a child-friendly, palatable, and flexibly dosable (e.g., syrup) form of HIV
medicine is one example. Tom Kalil, Deborah M. Birx & Colleen V. Chien, Accelerating Access to Innovation
and
Saving
Children’s
Lives,
WHITE
HOUSE
(Dec.
5,
2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/12/05/accelerating-access-innovation-and-saving-children-slives.
75
Tuberculosis, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.who.int/news-room/factsheets/detail/tuberculosis.
76
See Kalil et al., supra note 74.
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unique to a poor or underrepresented population, there is a greater risk of it going
unmet as innovative energy is drawn elsewhere.77
Economic inequality can intensify these dynamics. The rise of the rich in the
last few decades has caused firms to strategically shift their innovative energies
toward rich households78 and away from mass markets, where margins are
smaller. Although rich consumers are more profitable, intense competition in the
premium goods segment has led, somewhat counterintuitively, to lower inflation
of high-priced goods, like craft beer, relative to lower-priced goods, like massmarket beer.79 Income inequality means the innovation needs of the lower class
may be overlooked, which, in turn, exacerbates consumption and income
inequality. But it also creates consumer choice and hopefully, eventually,
higher-quality goods for all.
***
Taken together, the inequalities of innovation reveal some underappreciated
contrasts and surprising insights. Equality of opportunity to innovate, among
potential inventors, is essential to progress and the achievement of human
potential, but some amount of economic inequality also supports
experimentation, risk-taking, and racing for rents. Equality of access to
innovation among the masses encompasses not only the affordability but also
the availability of innovations to meet the needs of diverse populations. The
commitment to equality of access to innovation extends to essential or basic
goods, but not necessarily to others. The relationship between each of the
inequalities of innovation is complex, contested, and non-generalizable across
specific contexts. For example, if extreme inequality is a problem, perfect
equality of income, access, or opportunity is not necessarily desirable if it means
everyone will be worse off. The demand for justice is not necessarily that all
incomes or outcomes be equal, or even that every single opportunity be open to
all, but that all have the right to not only survive but thrive.
Fig. 1: Dimensions of the Inequalities of Innovation

77
See generally Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation
Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153 (2016) (accounting the various policy and quasi-policy mechanisms that
have been suggested to correct these imbalances).
78
Xavier Jaravel, The Unequal Gains from Product Innovations, 134 Q.J. ECON. 715, 717 (2019)
(demonstrating how, empirically and theoretically, higher-income households experienced a faster increase in
product variety and lower inflation due to firms becoming increasingly attuned to their needs in the face of rising
inequality).
79
See id. at 716, 755–57.
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The Inequalities of
Innovation

Impacted Population

Example Dimensions

Economic (Wealth
and Income)
Inequality

All

Top (1%) vs. decile (10%) or
“general” inequality; global vs.
national inequality

Inequality of
Opportunity to
Innovate

Potential Inventors

Proxied by innovation-driven
economic mobility, robustness
of entry; concentration vs.
competition in innovation

Inequality of
Access to
Innovation

Consumers

Availability vs. affordability;
essential vs. non-essential
innovations; and
segmented/neglected vs.
crossover conditions and
customers

B. Three Patents and a Century of Innovation
But how do the inequalities of wealth, opportunity to innovate, and access
to innovation map to particular inventions? The following section explores this
question through the lens of three innovations over the last century: a steam
engine invention from the 1900s during the golden age of opportunity to
innovate; a pharmaceutical drug from the 1960s that raises questions about
equality of access to innovation; and a database automation invention from 2015,
the job-replacing nature of which has implications for equality of income. Each
invention was selected as illustrative of the era in which it arose.80
The third invention—database automation—may be the most familiar to
contemporary readers. As described below, many of the traits that make that
patent similar to others of its era—its multiple ethnically diverse and
international inventors, digital nature, and assignment to a large corporation—
distinguish it from earlier patents. Over the decades spanned by these three
patents, patented innovation has become more corporate, foreign-origin,
metropolitan, coastal, and information technology based.

80
See infra Appendix (showing figures depicting the settings and technologies of invention from the
1900s or 1980s to 2020).
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Using inventions to study the relationship between inequality and innovation
has several benefits. The “what” of a patent—the problem the disclosed
invention solves and how it does so—in many cases has implications for the
relationship between labor and capital at the heart of economic inequality. The
“who” of a patent—the recorded inventors and owner—reveals who has an
opportunity to innovate. The “how” of a patent—how long it stays in force and
how it is kept or traded—influences the availability and accessibility of the
invention to consumers, bearing upon inequality of access to innovation.
But studying innovations through the patents that cover them has its
drawbacks as well. Inventions are downstream; they are the product, rather than
the starting point, of many decisions that impact who participates in innovation.
In addition, many patents never mature into commercialized innovations and
therefore have limited relevance to consumer access or economic inequality.
Lastly, many, perhaps most, innovations are never patented. To avoid these
pitfalls, care was taken to choose commercially important inventions for which
patent records, as well as historical and forensic information, were available.
1. A “Steam Engine” (1905) and the Golden Age of Innovation
Opportunity
Over nine million patents and over one hundred years ago, the Patent Office
granted patent 782,814 (“’814 patent”) for a “Steam Engine.”81 The patent
covered “new and useful [i]mprovements” in the production of steam engines
that simplified their manufacture.82 By the time the ’814 patent was granted,
nearly 150 years had elapsed since James Watt’s introduction of the steam
engine.83
But the patent’s inventorship suggests the broad opportunities to innovate
available to (some) Americans during this time, and its content hints at the
impact of steam engine technologies on the relationship between labor and
(innovation) capital. The ’814 patent was invented by Frank H. Ball,84 who, like

81

U.S. Patent No. 782,814 (filed Jan. 26, 1903).
Id.
83
See Aimee Chin, Chinhui Juhn & Peter Thompson, Technical Change and the Demand for Skills
During the Second Industrial Revolution: Evidence from the Merchant Marine, 1891–1912, 88 REV. ECON. &
STATS. 572, 572 (2006) (outlining the timeline of the steam engine innovation).
84
’814 patent, supra note 81.
82

2022]

THE INEQUALITIES OF INNOVATION

19

most inventors at the time,85 invented independently.86 Ball was from New
Jersey, part of the mid-Atlantic region’s reign as the most inventive part of the
United States.87
During the “golden age” of inventing,88 inventors devised, patented, and
capitalized on their ideas independently, outside of corporations. 89 Unlike the
British patent system on which it was based, the early American patent system
encouraged equality of opportunity and broad participation through low fees,
merit-based review,90 and ways for geographically dispersed inventors to
participate.91 It worked to a degree:92 rural patenting was robust and the majority
of “great inventors” had little to no formal schooling.93 Less than a quarter of
inventors attended college, often relying instead on the ingenuity that led their
forebears to immigrate to the United States in the first place.94
Steam engine technology itself created demand for unskilled labor.
Compared to earlier-generation sailboats,95 which required many skilled seamen
to move the ropes and position the masts, spares, and sails, 96 the new steam-

85

See Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, The Reorganization of
Inventive Activity in the United States During the Early Twentieth Century 46 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 15440, 2009) (showing that 70.8% of patents were not assigned in 1890–91); infra Appendix
Figure 2: Independent Inventors 1900–2020.
86
After inventing the steam engine, Ball continued to invent, at times with his son F.A. Ball. See, e.g.,
Brake, U.S. Patent No. 779,111 (issued Jan. 3, 1905); Friction-Clutch, U.S. Patent No. 808,622 (issued Jan. 2,
1906); Carbureter, U.S. Patent No. 1,391,930 (issued Sept. 27, 1921); see also CARL BREER, THE BIRTH OF
CHRYSLER CORPORATION AND ITS ENGINEERING LEGACY 44 (1995). This made Ball more prolific than the
typical inventor in the 1900s, who had only one or two patents to their name. B. ZORINA KHAN, THE
DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–
1920, at 112 (2005) (reporting that, in 1850, about 60% of inventors had a single patent to their name and about
18% had two).
87
KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION, supra note 86, at 189 tbl.7.1.
88
MERRITT ROE SMITH ET AL., HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INVENTION & CREATIVITY 18 (2003),
http://web.mit.edu/monicaru/Public/old%20stuff/For%20Dava/Grad%20Library.Data/PDF/history3289136129/history.pdf.
89
Id. at 22.
90
Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation: Evidence from Economic History, 27 J. ECON. PERSPS. 23, 27
(2013) (describing the markedly lower patenting fees charged in the United States compared to Britain).
91
See id. (for example, by permitting patenting by mail).
92
Even as it was geographically open, the American patent system was structurally in many ways closed
to patenting by foreigners, slaves, and married women as inventors. For a description, see infra in Section II.B.2.
93
B. Zorina Khan & Kenneth L. Sokolof, Institutions and Democratic Invention in 19th-Century
America: Evidence from “Great Inventors,” 1790–1930, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 395, 396–97 (2004).
94
Id. at 397.
95
Chin, supra note 83, at 573.
96
Id.
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powered boats were simple to operate.97 A lead engineer looked after the
machinery and ensured that boilers and other parts functioned properly.98
Unskilled workers were also needed to continuously carry and shovel coal into
the boiler.99 The transition to steam-based travel favored lower-skill workers,
making it biased toward the unskilled.
2. “Naloxone” (1966) and Access to Innovation
Decades later, the USPTO granted patent 3,254,088 (“’088 patent”) to a
morphine derivative that would come to be known by the trade name
“naloxone.”100 Unlike Ball’s steam engine invention, naloxone’s breakthrough
was serendipitous, the product of efforts by inventor Jack Fishman and his
collaborators to find a constipation cure.101 But, like the steam engine, naloxone
was as typical of its time as it was different from previous generations of
inventions.
Perhaps the most dramatic change in the nature of innovation in the twentieth
century was the shift in the setting of invention from independent inventing
during its golden age as described above102 to corporate research and
development performed in companies and nonprofit labs. Both settings were at
play in the development of naloxone: Fishman was a staff member of the SloanKettering Driven Institute for Cancer Research, and also held a part-time
position at a private lab.103 From 1906, the time of the steam engine, to 1966,
the first patent on naloxone, the share of patents to independent inventors shrank
dramatically, from about 80% to less than 20%, while the share of patents to
corporations soared.104 As Catherine Fisk has described, the rise of employee
invention and associated assignment of patent rights to companies removed the
“fuel of interest,” as supplied by a patent, from “the fire of genius.”105 This
97

Id.
Id.
99
Id. at 574.
100
See Morphine Derivative, U.S. Patent No. 3,254,088 (filed Mar. 14, 1961) (issued May 31, 1966).
101
Nancy D. Campbell, Just Say Know: A Social History of How Naloxone Came to Matter, 34 SOC.
HIST. ALCOHOL & DRUGS 196, 207–08 (2020).
102
SMITH ET AL., supra note 88, at 18.
103
William Yardley, Jack Fishman Dies at 83; Saved Many from Overdose, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/business/jack-fishman-who-helped-develop-a-drug-to-treat-overdosesdies-at-83.html.
104
See infra Appendix Figure 2: Share of Patents to Independent Inventors.
105
Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ From the ‘Fire of Genius’: Law and the Employee
Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (1998) (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Second Lecture on
Discoveries and Inventions (Feb. 11, 1859), in THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN A SSOCIATION, THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 363 (Roy Basler 3d ed. 1953)).
98
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transition accompanied shifts in the nature of innovation. Early in the 1900s,
most patents covered “mechanical engineering” inventions, like the steam
engine.106 But from the 1950s to the 1980s, chemical inventions like naloxone,
as well as petrochemicals and plastics, were ascendant,107 as alluded to by a
famous line of the movie The Graduate.108
When the opioid epidemic of the 2010s hit (the third of several),109 naloxone
ended up in the center of a major access-to-innovation controversy.
Administration of the drug, by then deemed “essential,”110 was one of the only
ways to avoid overdose deaths. Two formulations were introduced: Narcan, a
nasal spray,111 and Evzio, an applicator designed to be used by third parties
following a set of voice prompts.112 The chemical was by now old and cheap,
but these delivery mechanisms were new and expensive. The price of Evzio
climbed at one point to $4,500 for a two-pack,113 placing it far out of reach of
most overdose patients.114 Health officials demanded that the new delivery
mechanisms be made more affordable and accessible, to “save the lives of
people overdosing.”115 Drugmaker Kaléo eventually bowed to public pressure
and cut the price.116 Whether or not the firm’s resulting “loss of profit” led to

106

See infra Appendix Figure 4: Technology Trends Among Granted Patents.
See infra Appendix Figure 4: Technology Trends Among Granted Patents.
108
THE GRADUATE (Lawrence Truman Productions 1967). The movie features the famous line: “‘I have
one word for you.’ ‘Plastics. There is a great future in plastics.’” Anne M. Fine, What the Movie “The Graduate”
Got Wrong, THRIVE (Nov. 30, 2016), https://thriveglobal.com/stories/what-the-movie-the-graduate-got-wrong2/.
109
Understanding
the
Epidemic,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
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slowed innovation that could have further extended access to lifesaving drugs
among the “worst-off” is both something that a Rawlsian might ask and
something that is impossible to answer with certainty.
3. “Database Automation” (2015) and Income Inequality
By the time the Patent Office issued patent 9,201,944, covering database
automation techniques to Oracle Corporation,117 “electrical engineering” rather
than chemical inventions dominated.118 The first named inventor on the patent
was company founder and then-CEO Larry Ellison,119 who, for his
contributions, received total compensation that was more than 1,000 times what
the average employee earned.120 But while the steam engine and naloxone
patents named one and two inventors, respectively, the Oracle patent named
nine.121 The majority of Ellison’s co-inventors have Indian surnames, and all
appear to reside in the San Francisco Bay Area,122 reflecting more recent trends.
Using ethnic name registries, Bill Kerr and others have traced the increase of
shares of Asian inventors on U.S. patents123 to the point that, by 2018, one in
every eleven patents was invented or co-invented by a Chinese or Indian
individual residing in the Bay Area.124 According to LinkedIn, several of the
Oracle inventors came to the United States to attend graduate school before
joining the company,125 also reflective of a growing trend.126
What about the impact of “database automation,” not on Oracle workers, but
U.S. Patent No. 9,201,944 B2 (issued Dec. 1, 2015) [hereinafter ’944 Patent].
See infra Appendix Figure 4: Technology Trends Among Granted Patents.
119
’944 Patent, supra note 117.
120
Dawn Kawamoto, Scary: Oracle CEO-Worker Salary Gap, DICE (Sept. 27, 2013),
https://insights.dice.com/2013/09/27/scary-oracle-ceo-worker-salary-gap-071/.
121
’944 Patent, supra note 117.
122
Id. (listing inventors Amit Ganesh, Vineet Marwah, Anindya C. Patthak, Shasank K. Chavan, and
Manosiz Bhattacharyya).
123
William R. Kerr, U.S. High-Skilled Immigration, Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Empirical
Approaches and Evidence 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 19377, 2013) (showing the
increase in shares of Indian and Chinese inventors from 1975 to 2004, from under 2% to 6% and 9%,
respectively); accord Katie Puckett, World in Motion, KATIE PUCKETT’S WRITING (Sept. 15, 2019),
https://katiepuckett.com/2019/09/15/world-in-motion/.
124
WILLIAM R. KERR, THE GIFT OF GLOBAL TALENT 50, 59 (2019) (relying on analysis of surnames that
reflect ethnic heritage).
125
See, e.g., Amit Ganesh, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/amit-ganesh-a5692a/ (last visited
June 30, 2020) (reporting also that Ganesh started a PhD at Stanford but left after one year); Vineet Marwah,
LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/vineetmarwah/ (last visited June 30, 2020).
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the employees of Oracle’s corporate customers? Although more work is required
to enter information into a database and set up its continual capture, subsequent
uses require a lot less manual data entry and processing, reducing headcount.
Across Oracle’s extensive enterprise database customer base, skilled workers
have become more efficient, databases have taken over the tasks previously
performed by low-skilled workers, and new opportunities have been created.127
Similar stories of automation leading to job loss and rising inequality can be told
across the economy.128
C. Tensions Within and Among Inequalities
Considered separately, each of the inventions described above tells its own
story about the inequalities of innovation, reflecting who gets to participate and
profit from innovation, who gets access to innovation, and who wins and who
loses economically from the resulting innovation. Analyzing them together
reinforces the tensions between notions of equity and innovation, as explored
below.

127
ORACLE, IMPROVE PRODUCTIVITY & EFFICIENCY WITH SELF-SERVICE PORTALS 10–11 (2013),
https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/middleware/webcenter/portal/overview/webcenter-portal-customers2016644.pdf.
128
Harry Holzer, Understanding the Impact of Automation on Workers, Jobs, and Wages, BROOKINGS
(Jan. 19, 2022), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2022/01/19/understanding-the-impact-of-automationon-workers-jobs-and-wages/ (describing those who are directly displaced by machines, including many clerical
and production workers, as among those who “lose out,” adding to labor market inequality).
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Fig. 2: Tensions Within and Among the Inequalities of Innovation
Inequalities of Innovation

Examples / Tensions

Economic Inequality

“Unskilled-unbiased” (steam engine)
vs. “Skilled-biased” (database
automation) technological change

Inequality of Opportunity to
Innovate

Domestic equality of opportunity
(steam engine) vs. global equality of
opportunity (database automation)

Inequality of Access to Innovation

Competition (generic naloxone) vs.
consumer availability (Evzio applicator)
vs. consumer affordability (Evzio
pricing)

1. Income Inequality: Independent Versus Corporate Inventors, Skilled
Versus Unskilled Bias
Who benefits from innovation on the production (as opposed to
consumption) side? The vignettes above highlight two issues concerning how
the spoils of innovation are shared by the innovator and her employer, and, more
generally, how innovation impacts workers.
Though patent rights have always vested initially in inventors, the rise of
corporate- or lab-based invention under assignment and associated equitable
doctrines129 means that, in the United States, the firm, not the inventor, owns the
invention. Unlike in a number of major European jurisdictions, there are limited
expectations of remuneration by the employer other than the employee’s
salary.130 The progression from the “solo” inventor of the steam engine patent

129
Including the “shop right” and “hired to invent” doctrines, the latter which operates on the theory that
the inventor hired to solve a particular problem has already been rewarded through her compensation. United
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933).
130
Morag Peberdy & Alain Strowel, Employee’s Rights to Compensation for Inventions—A European
Perspective,
LIFE
SCIS.
64
(Mar.
5,
2010),
https://www.cov.com/~/media/files/corporate/publications/2010/01/employees-rights-to-compensation-forinventions—-a-european-perspective.ashx (describing policies in France and Germany).
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to the nine Oracle employees named on the database patent suggests that the
gains from innovation are presently more likely to flow to investors than
inventors. However, the distinction may be less important than it seems. While
independent inventors, similar to Ball, have captured a diminishing share of
overall patents, investment in technological innovation and entrepreneurship is
at an all-time high.131 In addition, individuals benefit, both from being named as
inventors, even on corporate patents, and from the valuable knowledge they
acquire through invention, which, in many cases, can be taken to other firms.
Non-competes are illegal in California, and it appears that at least one of the
Oracle inventors has gone on to become a successful tech executive at a
competing firm, drawing upon his knowledge of databases.132
A second set of issues is centered around Ricardo’s “machinery question:”
will technology take the jobs?133 The steam engine and database automation
inventions provide conflicting answers underscoring that innovation does not
impact the demand for jobs consistently. Steam engine technology is what
Clayton Christiansen calls an “empowering” innovation—one that so
fundamentally changes how things are done that it creates new jobs for those
who build, distribute, and provide products and services newly made possible.134
Steamboat technology created demand for coal carriers and a whole generation
of workers while reducing the need for highly skilled sailors, making it
unskilled-biased. “Efficiency” inventions, on the other hand, reduce the cost of
making and distributing existing products and services, in theory freeing them
up for investments in empowering innovations.135 By reducing the need for
repetitive, manual tasks like data entry, database automation innovations have
reduced the number of clerical and accounting tasks for which human workers
are needed.136
Artificial intelligence is predicted to lead to substantial job losses across the
economy,137 but not uniformly. Among the jobs most likely to be impacted by
131
Sam Shead, Venture Capitalists Invested More Money than Ever into Start-Ups Last Year, CNBC (Jan.
13, 2022, 9:31 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/13/vcs-invested-more-money-than-ever-into-start-upslast-year.html. (“Venture capitalists invested more than $675 billion in start-ups worldwide in 2021, doubling
2020’s previous all-time high.”).
132
See Amit Ganesh, LINKEDIN, supra note 125 (indicating that Ganesh now runs Google Cloud’s
database portfolio of products as a VP of Engineering).
133
See RICARDO, supra note 45, at 283.
134
Clayton M. Christensen, A Capitalist’s Dilemma, Whoever Wins on Tuesday, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/business/a-capitalists-dilemma-whoever-becomes-president.html.
135
Id.
136
Though it is also true that database technologies have opened up new ways of doing business, taking
on some characteristics of empowering innovations.
137
Susan Lund, James Manyika, Liz Hilton Segel, André Dua, Bryan Hancock, Scott Rutherford & Brent
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advances in artificial intelligence is high-skill radiology, because computers are
proving to be better at spotting patterns in scans than trained doctors.138
Likewise, numerous automotive and mechanic jobs that do not require a college
degree are among those least likely to be replaced by robots, because they
require in-home service or on-site individualized problem-solving.139
These examples illustrate the distinct, and often unpredictable, ways that the
introduction of technology can impact the distribution of work and wages. The
interface between patented innovation and labor is both innovation-specific and
job-specific. The regulatory and social context also matters. Technology is not
destiny.
2. Equality of Opportunity to Innovate: Global Versus Domestic
A closely related question to who benefits from innovation is who is poised
to participate in innovation, which relates to equality of opportunity to innovate.
In one sense, the solo, independent invention of Ball’s steam engine would seem
to have little in common with the collaborative, immigrant-driven invention of
the Oracle database. In another sense, though, the two represent bookends in the
American equality-of-opportunity story, in which a person’s ingenuity, hard
work, and determination, regardless of her background, will be rewarded. But
whether recent trends are cause for celebration or concern depends on who you
ask.
To optimists, one of the greatest virtues of America’s tech sector is that it
has brought talent from around the world to contribute to growing the American
economy. Immigrants have founded some 40% of Fortune 500 companies140 and
started the majority of “unicorn” startups.141 Silicon Valley owes much to global

Macon, The Future of Work in America: People and Places, Today and Tomorrow, MCKINSEY & CO. (July 11,
2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/the-future-of-work-in-america-people-andplaces-today-and-tomorrow# (“[W]ithin 60 percent of jobs, at least 30 percent of activities could be automated
. . . [with] currently demonstrated technologies.”).
138
Sara
Reardon,
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Robot
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NATURE
(Dec.
18,
2019),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03847-z.
139
See Sarah Gonser, Ten Jobs that Are Safe from Robots, HECHINGER REP. (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://hechingerreport.org/ten-jobs-that-are-safe-from-robots/ (arguing that automotive and mechanic jobs are
robot-proof jobs because they require “technical knowledge plus problem-solving and customer service skills”).
140
Alice Gast, A Magic Pony and America’s Unicorns: How Immigrants Spark Innovation, WORLD
ECON. F. (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/a-magic-pony-and-americas-unicornswhy-we-need-immigrants-to-spark-innovation-in-business-and-science/.
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4 (2016), https://www.immigrationresearch.org/system/files/Immigrants-and-Billion-Dollar-Startups.NFAPPolicy-Brief.March-2016.pdf. Unicorn startups are those valued at $1 billion or more. Id.
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talent: in 2016, more than half of computer science doctoral degree earners were
immigrants.142 Their success, it would seem, proves that the United States offers
an equal opportunity for the most talented individuals, regardless of origin, to
succeed.
Yet, these trends also support a more pessimistic view centered on the failure
of the United States to cultivate domestic STEM capacity to fill local needs. An
accounting of the costs and benefits of high-skill immigration reveals why: when
a firm employs a highly skilled worker, both the immigrant and the firm benefit.
The immigrant gains expanded opportunities and wages, and the firm taps into
a greater supply of talents and skills.143 But, at the same time, some domestic
workers lose, faced with increased competition for high-skilled jobs. When the
tech industry blames a skills gap for needing to look abroad but does not raise
wages,144 they appear to be putting their own self-interests and the desire to
access talent from a broad range of people above the interests of citizens. So
does the tech lobby’s interest in high-skilled immigration but more muted
presence in policy discussions about improving domestic STEM education. 145
Leveling opportunities globally, it would seem, reduces the need to insist on
shoring up equality of opportunity domestically.
Loosely applying a version of Rawls’s “Difference Principle”—that
inequalities that improve the worst-off are tolerable—does high-skilled
immigration benefit all, including those with the least? Studies have found that
a 1% increase in immigrant college graduates resulted in 9–18% more patents
per capita, benefiting the whole economy.146 Rather than being displaced, native
patenting actually increases when H-1B workers innovate,147 which implies that

142
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MGMT. SCI. 1529, 1529 (2013).
144
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(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20382, 2014) (questioning the idea of a “skills gap” and
positing that over-education is a more pressing problem than under-education).
145
See Pawel Popiel, The Tech Lobby: Tracing the Contours of New Media Elite Lobbying Power, 11
COMMC’N CULTURE & CRITIQUE 566, 572, 578 (2018) (showing that, according to an analysis of House lobbying
disclosures from 2005–2016, immigration, but not STEM education, is one of the top priorities of the tech
lobby); Pawel Popiel, The Tech Lobby: Tracing the Contours of New Media Elite Lobbying Power 1, app. at 20
tab.2
(2018),
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immigration grows the innovation pie. However, given regional differences,
whether these trends put “the worst-off” in the United States on better footing is
harder to discern. Even the idea that expanding immigration gives rise to global
“equality of opportunity,” upon scrutiny, may deserve qualification. Two out of
the three immigrant Oracle inventors148 attended India Institute of Technology
(IIT) colleges, which some view as bastions of privilege.149 Even for a concept
as universally accepted as equality of opportunity, competing considerations
may come into play.
3. Equality of Access to Innovation: Availability Versus Affordability
Among the inequalities of innovation, conflicts may arise not only along
dimensions of a particular ideal (i.e., global vs. domestic equality of opportunity)
but between egalitarian goals. What happened after the invention of naloxone
shows how the goal of equality of access to innovation, in terms of availability
and affordability, was not necessarily served initially by the expiration of the
initial patent that made generic entry possible.
Several years after naloxone was first patented, it was approved for use in
emergency treatment of opioid overdose via injection into a muscle or vein by a
professional.150 The patent expired in 1985,151 and, from 1985–86, four new
injectable formulations were approved.152 However, despite the new availability
of the drug, use did not grow.153 The waning of the heroin epidemic played some
part.154 But so did the waning of the patent. According to accounts, as profits
disappeared with the expiration of the naloxone patent, “there was no longer

148
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much incentive to market it extensively.”155 Under these circumstances,
improving conditions for generic entry did not necessarily translate into
improved access for consumers.
When the opioid epidemic hit a few decades later, demand increased but so
did problems with a lack of availability of appropriate versions of the drug. The
approved delivery path was through a prescription obtained from a doctor.156
However, as the number of opioid overdoses increased, so did the need for third
parties, like first responders, to administer the drug. But such administration was
limited, in part because of the risk of injury to the patient during injection.157
Although relabeling the drug provided a path forward, a lack of patents on the
drug meant that no single firm was willing to invest the millions of dollars
required to educate the market.158 That the U.S. healthcare system relies on
private firms to do this work arguably contributes to a high risk, high reward
dynamic in which patents play an integral role.
The introduction of the easier-to-use and highly patented devices described
earlier, in Section I.B.2., boosted access by expanding availability of the drug in
different forms. The company’s pricing strategy also drastically limited the
affordability of the drug in its lifesaving form, as discussed earlier.159 But at the
end of the day, it was likely the promise of exclusivity and the ability to price
freely, not the greater opportunity to compete alone, that created the incentives
needed to induce innovation in the administration of the drug.
***
When the inequalities of innovation are considered in view of several key
inventions, the result is a textured story. Economic inequality is a big part of the
problem, but it may also be part of the solution when it comes to stimulating
advances that will eventually meet the needs of the worst-off. Changes in the
nature of innovation, as well as the balance of rights under employment and
immigration law, influence the distribution of the gains from innovation. Recent
shifts in innovation have arguably been accompanied both by an expansion of
global equality of opportunity, and unequal domestic opportunities to participate
in innovation. Access to innovation has at least two dimensions: price and
availability. Price competition, through broad opportunity to participate, may
155
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drive down prices, increasing the affordability of existing innovations. But more
will be needed to foster the new innovations necessary to meet the unique needs
of underserved populations and reduce disparities in the availability of relevant
innovation.
If inequality in innovation is easy to spot, then the dynamics discussed
above160 may explain, in part, why it is hard to solve. First, there are multiple
egalitarian goals when it comes to innovation. Second, they are often in tension,
and rarely can be generalized. Finally, the impact of inequality of innovation is
often unpredictable and dependent not only on the nature of the technology, but
also the social, legal, and regulatory context. The next Part turns to the role that
innovation law and policy, in particular patent law, play in determining the
inequalities of innovation.
II. HOW PATENT LAW ALLEVIATES AND INTENSIFIES THE INEQUALITIES OF
INNOVATION
The previous Part examined three inequalities—of wealth/income,
opportunity, and access—with relevance to innovation. As the case studies
described above show, technological and market factors have shaped who
makes, profits from, and accesses innovation, and on what terms. But so have
law and policy. For example, labor law dictates what happens when jobs are
automated away, and immigration policies have enabled the rise in immigrant
inventorship in the United States.
Feeding into a larger conversation about the law as a central, not peripheral,
actor in the creation and perpetuation of economic inequality,161 this Part
explores the role of patent law and its administration in shaping the inequalities
of innovation. Just as the growth in economic inequality is attributable to
enhanced returns to capital as compared to economic growth, below, this Article
argues that by providing enhanced returns to “invention capital,” the patent
system rewards firms and individuals with such capital relative to those without
it, potentially widening the inequalities of innovation. This Article uses the term
“invention capital”162 to refer to the financial and human capital, including

160
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money, educational resources, skills, experience, and ideas, but also the “social
capital”163—who you know and can call on—that supports inventing and
innovation.
To be sure, the impact of patent policy on the distribution of income,
opportunity, and access in many cases will be less direct than that of, for
example, education policy (on equality of opportunity), tax policy (on economic
inequality), or competition policy (on equality of access). Further, patent policy
is only one of many forms of innovation policy,164 and patented innovation is
only one type of innovation. Care must be taken not to overemphasize the
importance of patent incentives relative to other innovation.165 A final objection
to this exercise might be that if we do not maximize innovation, then there will
be less to redistribute.166
Notwithstanding these arguments, applying an inequalities lens to patent law
is worthwhile for at least a few reasons. The uneven distribution of “invention
capital” bears upon the opportunity to participate in innovation. The “public
franchise” nature of patents, which “take from the public rights of immense
value, and bestow them upon the patentee,” as the Supreme Court has said, 167
makes the system accountable to public interests. Patents also intersect with
public law doctrines, like tax and competition law. The extent to which the
patent bargain is being used to extend, not suppress, opportunity to innovate and
access innovation directly shapes the system’s ability to support equitable
economic growth.
Building on the tensions highlighted in Part I, this Part explores the ways in
which patents can both alleviate and exacerbate the inequalities of innovation.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanfurrjeffdyer/2018/09/04/innovation-capital-the-secret-ingredient-behindthe-worlds-most-innovative-leaders/?sh=6a0d6315fdf3 (using the term “innovation capital” differently to refer
to intangible personal resources that “help[] you win resources to commercialize novel ideas”).
163
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164
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165
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Invention-driven entrepreneurship, a particular strain of the American rags-toriches story,168 can create wealth and economic mobility. The system’s inclusive
nature enables applicants to gain the validation of a patent, fostering equality of
opportunity. The development and diffusion of innovation, through licensing
and differential pricing during the patent and generic production after the
patent’s expiry, support access to innovation. But several mechanisms cut in the
opposite direction. The cost and complexity of the patent system tilt the playing
field toward firms and people with “invention capital” and away from those
without it. This complexity has also posed a challenge to the work of regulators
responsible for promoting equality of access and opportunity to innovate.
A. How Patents Alleviate the Inequalities of Innovation
This section outlines ways in which patents alleviate the inequalities of: (1)
wealth and income; (2) opportunity to participate in innovation; and (3) access
to innovation. Though by no means exhaustive, it draws upon legal, literary,
economic, and empirical accounts of the patent system to consider the
intersections of patent law and the various inequalities.

168
As embodied by “Horatio Alger” heroes. Ryan T. Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case Studies of
Patent Assertion Entities, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 5 n.5 (2014).
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Fig. 3: Patent Mechanisms that Alleviate the Inequalities of Innovation
The Inequalities of Innovation
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1. Reducing Economic Inequality Through Validation and “Invention
Capital” Creation
One way in which patented innovation reduces economic inequality is by
helping those with less gain more over their lifetimes. The inventors and
inventions of the previous Part hint at these paths to prosperity. Frank Ball’s
patents served as the basis for the Ball Engine Co., the company he co-founded
with his partner.169 Before he was known as “Jack Fishman,” the inventor of
naloxone, Jacob Fiszman fled Nazi occupation in Poland with his parents.170 One
of the inventors on the Oracle patent, who immigrated to the United States for
schooling, has gone on to become a Silicon Valley executive. 171
But patents can also help those with much gain even more. Larry Ellison was
one of the richest people in the world by the time he was issued the ’944

169

KENNETH L. COPE, AMERICAN STEAM ENGINE BUILDERS: 1800–1900, at 24 (2006).
Yardley, supra note 103.
171
See Amit Ganesh, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/amit-ganesh-a5692a/ (last visited July 1,
2021) (indicating that Ganesh went from being an Oracle employee to a VP at Google).
170
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patent.172 His company has ranked among the top fifty patentees173 and has used
its patents to sue other large companies.174 Is patented innovation actually
helping to lift incomes at the bottom relative to the top, or making the rich, and
the dominant firms they work for, richer? Both, the empirical research suggests.
Philippe Aghion and his coauthors have analyzed the relationship between
changes in patenting and changes in income inequality from 1980 to 2015. 175
When the researchers looked at entities that had increased their patenting
intensity in general, they did not find an increase in economic mobility. In fact,
they found the opposite: increases in the intensity of patenting were correlated
with increases in “top income inequality.”176 The accumulation of patents made
the very rich (top 1%) richer, consistent with what we might call the “Larry
Ellison effect.”177
However, when the analysis was limited to patenting by first-time patentees
(or “new entrants”), the opposite was true: first-time patenting was positively
associated with both increasing economic mobility and decreasing general
inequality.178 Collectively, these facts implicate a Rawlsian tradeoff: the growth
in patented innovation has made the rich richer but also the poor richer.
California illustrates how both can be true. There, the very rich owe much to
innovation: 29% of the increase in the top 1%’s income share over the past
decades is due to innovation.179 But, economic mobility is also high—“much
higher than those in the least innovative state”—thanks, at least in part, to
patented innovation.180
But are patents doing the work of innovation-driven economic
172
Chase Peterson-Withorn, 2015 Forbes 400: Full List of America’s Richest People, FORBES (Sept. 29,
2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chasewithorn/2015/09/29/2015-forbes-400-full-list-of-americas-richestpeople/?sh=5f4c29b73c64.
173
Samuel Stebbins, The World’s 50 Most Innovative Companies, USA TODAY (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2018/01/12/worlds-50-most-innovativecompanies/1023095001/.
174
Namely Google, in the early stages of the Oracle v. Google suit currently pending before the Supreme
Court. See generally Sue Gee, 10 Years On: Oracle V Google Still Ongoing, I PROGRAMMER (Aug. 16, 2020),
https://www.i-programmer.info/news/82-heritage/13925-10-years-on-oracle-v-google.html.
175
See Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, Antonin Bergeaud, Richard Blundell & David Hemous,
Innovation and Top Income Inequality, 86 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 2 (2019).
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 5.
179
Id. at 32.
180
Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, Antonin Bergeaud, Richard Blundell & David Hemous, Innovation,
Income Inequality, and Social Mobility, VOXEU (July 28, 2015), https://voxeu.org/article/innovation-incomeinequality-and-social-mobility.
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empowerment, or are just along for the ride? It is important to acknowledge that
the question is irrelevant for the many innovative firms that do not patent. In
addition, the answer is likely to be unique for each firm, based on the relative
importance of the patent to non-patent assets and comparative advantages.
However, relevant research, which has tracked startups that do and do not
succeed on their patent applications,181 finds that getting a first patent acts as a
catalyst on the path to success.182 Companies that win the patent “lottery” “create
more jobs, enjoy faster sales growth, and are more innovative,”183 though these
gains may be at the expense of other startups. Just as startups appear to be more
responsive to gaining patents, they also seem to be more sensitive to losing them.
Galasso and Schankerman have found, in their study of patent invalidations, that
the loss of patent rights by small firms significantly increases the likelihood of
an exit from patenting.184
2. Expanding Equality of Opportunity Through the Currency of
Invention185
Why might the impacts of entrant patents be so distinct when compared to
the impacts of general patenting?186 For all patent owners, a patent validates an
idea’s originality and offers some level of protection. But when an entrepreneur
lacks a proven track record, revenue stream, or vetted model, a patent can set
her business apart from others. Open to all that apply, the patent system’s
inclusiveness offers one way for a newcomer to increase her odds of success,
through the “certification” of a patent.187 Having a patent not only serves as a

181
See Joan Farre-Mensa, Deepak Hedge & Alexander Ljungqvist, What Is a Patent Worth? Evidence
from the U.S. Patent “Lottery”, 75 J. FIN. 639, 640 (2020).
182
Id. at 641; see Natarajan Balasubramanian & Jagadeesh Sivadasan, What Happens When Firms
Patent? New Evidence from U.S. Economic Census Data, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 126, 144 (2011) (finding that
increases in patent stock are associated with increases in firm size, scope, and skill and capital intensity,
including among first-time patentees).
183
Farre-Mensa et al., supra note 181, at 641, 677.
184
Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patent Rights, Innovation, and Firm Exit, 49 RAND J. ECON.
64, 66 (2018).
185
For a discussion of software patents as a “currency,” see Colleen V. Chien, Software Patents as a
Currency, Not Tax, on Innovation, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1669, 1679–80 (2016).
186
See generally Peter Lee, Reconceptualizing the Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Shaping
Industry Structure, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1205–11 (2019) (reviewing the literature on how patents facilitate
entry and discussing the role of patents at distinct points in a firm’s life).
187
Indeed, patents have been argued to be “worth little in isolation; financially benefiting from patents
depends on institutions such as corporate rent-sharing and venture capital.” JONATHAN S. MASUR & LISA
LARRIMORE OUELLETTE, PATENT LAW: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 37 (2021). For a discussion of the
disproportional importance of IP rights for entrants and small companies, see generally JONATHAN M. BARNETT,
INNOVATORS, FIRMS, AND MARKETS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL LOGIC OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2021).
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signal in the market, but it also provides inventors with the confidence to share
about and publicize their inventions without fear of being ripped off, thereby
resolving the “Arrow information paradox.”188 Disclosures about an invention
outside of (but made possible by) a patent to potential investors, customers,
members of the scientific and technical community, and the public are
potentially just as important as disclosures within the four corners of the patent,
to the inventor, and to society.189
When an entrepreneur lacks the wealth, status, funding, or connections to
commercialize an idea, a patent can provide an economic asset that can be
borrowed upon, traded, or licensed. This is what happened with naloxone. Jack
Fishman’s small firm may not have had the commercialization capabilities
available to competitors, but his patent made it easier to sell the technology to a
much larger company, Dow DuPont,190 that did. The ways in which patents
flexibly empower have further been illustrated in film, fiction, and fact.
The movie Joy, in part, tells the real-life story of a divorced single mother
and serial inventor and entrepreneur, Joy Mangano.191 Her first experience ended
with the novel flea collar she devised being sold by a manufacturer before she
could get to market.192 Vowing to never lose out like that again, Mangano went
on to obtain one hundred patents covering household inventions, like the Miracle
Mop and Huggable Hangers.193 Her patents prevented her from being ripped off
and gave her time, as an outsider in the domestic cleaning industry, to develop
the profile and products on which she built a multimillion dollar household
goods empire.194 Patenting allowed Mangano to leverage not only her ingenuity,
but also her unique purview as a working mother. As she has explained, “I’m a
mom, I work, I have a house to clean, things to organize. We all have certain
similar needs, and I address them.”195

188
Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615 (1962).
189
Colleen V. Chien, Contextualizing Patent Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1852–53 (2016).
190
U.S. Patent No. 3,391,157 (assigned from Endo Labs. to E.I. DU Pont de Nemours and Co. Nov. 10,
1982),
https://assignment.uspto.gov/patent/index.html#/patent/search/resultFilterresultAbstract?searchInput=3254088
&id=3391157&type=patNum (showing the sale of Fishman’s naloxone patent to Dow DuPont).
191
Eliza Berman, The True Story Behind the Movie Joy, TIME (Dec. 27, 2015),
https://time.com/4161779/joy-movie-accuracy-fact-check/.
192
Id.
193
Id. (describing Huggable Hangers, one of Mangano’s many patented products, as “HSN’s best-selling
product of all time”).
194
Id.
195
Susan Konig, Cleaning Up in Business, With a Mop, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at 14.
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Inventing products that served the unique needs of women, particularly black
women, played a similar role in the meteoric rise in the early 1900s of Madam
C.J. Walker, America’s first self-made black female millionaire.196 Walker’s
business was based on the patented hair-care products197 she devised to address
her own hair loss issues and sold through an army of 40,000 agents who went to
churches and door-to-door.198 But her business was also a response to
segregationist policies and lack of knowledge and responsiveness of white
businesses to the needs of the black community.199 Hers is a prime example of
how patented inventions can expand opportunity to innovate as well as broaden
access to innovation.
For those with good ideas but without the entrepreneurial drive or talent200
of a Joy Mangano or Madame Walker, the sale or license of a patent, rather than
its commercialization, offers an alternative path to prosperity. The best-selling
novel, An American Marriage, features one Franklin Davenport, who goes from
being “a barefoot boy from Sunflower, Alabama,” to a millionaire based on an
invention he devises at home in his spare time and sells to a company. 201 The
life of fictional Davenport shares some parallels with the real life of Lonnie
Johnson. Though Johnson had worked for years as an engineer, he was
consistently underestimated as an African-American in a field in which he was
often “the only person of color in the room.”202 Developing a pressurized water
gun in his spare time,203 Johnson patented and licensed his invention, the “super
soaker,” to a company that would eventually be acquired by toymaker Hasbro,
creating one of the best-selling toys of all time.204
In the early patent system, the sale of one’s patent was a key way an inventor

196
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Madam Walker, the First Black American Woman to Be a Self-Made
Millionaire, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wnet/african-americans-many-rivers-to-cross/history/100-amazingfacts/madam-walker-the-first-black-american-woman-to-be-a-self-made-millionaire/ (last visited Oct. 12,
2020).
197
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 1,716,173 (filed May 16, 1928).
198
Gates, supra note 196.
199
Id.
200
For a discussion of how poverty interferes with invention and creativity, see Stephanie Plamondon
Bair, Impoverished IP, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 523, 539–46 (2020) (arguing that poverty interferes with the conditions
necessary for creativity and inventing, including time, mental space, and a long-term perspective).
201
TAYARI JONES, AN AMERICAN MARRIAGE 114 (2018).
202
Pagan Kennedy, Who Made That Super Soaker?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/magazine/who-made-that-super-soaker.html?_r=1&.
203
Lonnie Johnson, BIOGRAPHY.COM (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.biography.com/inventor/lonnie-gjohnson.
204
Id. (describing Johnson’s licensing of his product to Larami Corp., which was later acquired by
Hasbro).
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got paid. As Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson have written, “[i]f you were
poor with a good idea, it was one thing to take out a patent, which was not so
expensive, after all. It was another thing entirely to use that patent to make
money. One way, of course, was to sell the patent to someone else.”205 The
Patent Office played a key role in supporting markets for technology, not only
in issuing assets that could be traded, but also in providing information about
inventions for sale.206 Eventually finding its way to publications like Scientific
American, patent information supported a vibrant secondary market in
technology in which inventors and firms exchanged information, patents, and
innovation.207 Entities that cannot themselves commercialize the technologies
they develop rely on licensing to develop and disseminate products, to the
benefit of society, the licensee, and the licensor. Indeed, licenses from
universities and other research entities have seeded many therapeutic and drug
innovations developed by the biotechnology industry.208
3. Expanding Access to Innovation Through Diffusion via Incentives for
Follow-On Innovation and Commercialization, Price Discrimination,
and Spillovers
Although innovation initially enriches those at the top, its social impact, at
least as to broadly consumed crossover goods, comes from its broader diffusion.
As Austrian political economist Joseph Schumpeter said, “[t]he capitalist
achievement does not typically consist in providing more silk stockings for
queens but in bringing them within the reach of factory girls in return for steadily
decreasing amounts of effort. . . . [This] progressively raises the standard of life
of the masses.”209 As described below, patents support broad-based access to
innovation in several ways, including by encouraging follow-on invention and
commercialization, geographic diffusion, differential pricing, and spillovers,
both during and after the term of a patent. These mechanisms, in turn, operate
on both dimensions of access to innovation highlighted above: availability and
affordability.

205
DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER,
PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 33 (2012).
206
See Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology
in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, in LEARNING BY DOING IN MARKETS, FIRMS, AND
COUNTRIES 19, 22 (1999).
207
See id. at 22–23.
208
See Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Turns 30, 45 LES NOUVELLES 185, 188–89
(2010) (showing one estimate that puts this prevalence at 76%).
209
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY 67–68 (5th ed. 2003) (1976).
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a. Incentives to Commercialize and Diffuse, Enhancing Availability
When an innovation is initially devised, it is generally motivated by a
particular use case, situated within a particular community, within a particular
geography, together comprising the innovation’s initial target market. But the
potential market may be much broader. In the absence of tradable rights,
innovative ideas and know-how are fiercely guarded as trade secrets,210 and
limited in their diffusion by the capacity and desire of their owners. Patents can
accelerate commercialization by making it safer and easier for innovators,
working alone or with their licensees, to attract investment and partners in order
to commercialize the invention and reach additional markets. Studying the
growth of patent systems internationally, Petra Moser has considered how
patenting chemical inventions has impacted their reach. She found that as
patenting became more prevalent, inventive activity spread, leading the industry
to become significantly more geographically widespread.211 Licensing
partnerships are particularly important when the costs of entering a market
outweigh the benefits for the originator firm, and vice versa for a local or partner
firm.212
The ability to obtain patents, including on an ongoing basis, can also enhance
access to relevant inventions and formulations. It is axiomatic that without the
right to exclude, the pharmaceutical industry would not exist in its present form
because patents enable the recapture of the enormous costs of drug development
through a period of exclusivity. As the naloxone vignette illustrates, however,
the ability to seek patents on different formulations, methods of administration,
or other incremental inventions also drives investment in follow-on
improvements tailored to custom markets by the original innovator or a licensee.
The ability to patent incremental advances does raise other problems, as
described in the next subpart; however, the rents created by patents can be used
to support the further development of and, ultimately, wider diffusion of the
innovation.
b. By Enabling Price Discrimination, Boosting Affordability
Price discrimination—charging different prices for the same good or
210
Petra Moser, Do Patents Weaken the Localization of Innovations? Evidence from World’s Fairs, 71 J.
ECON. HIST. 363, 363 (2011).
211
Id. at 365.
212
See, e.g., Arianna Martinelli, Andrea Mina & Elena Romito, Collective Licensing and Asymmetric
Information: The Double Effect of the Medicine Patent Pool on Generic Drug Markets 1, 24 (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://wwws.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/clbe/events/innovation/documents/mina_martinelli.pdf.
(“[L]icensing—either voluntary or compulsory—is the most effective way to improve access to drugs.”).
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service—can further boost access to the worst-off. When a product is patented
in different jurisdictions and the original owner’s intellectual property rights are
not “exhausted” by the sale, the patentee can charge different prices in different
markets without worrying about resales of low-priced goods undercutting profits
in the high-priced market. The presence of patent rights in both jurisdictions
supports lower prices in the secondary market, allowing more low-priced
consumers to get access than if the price was the same across all markets. 213
A study of the timing of new drugs launched between 1983 and 2002
demonstrates how stronger patent rights can encourage diffusion.214 It found that
while price regulation delayed entry into certain countries, stronger patent rights
accelerated entry.215 It is not necessarily surprising that patent rights drive entry
by patent owners, insofar as they are associated with a lower risk of competition
and a higher chance of profitability. In addition, rights-owner-controlled
dissemination of a product will not necessarily be as rapid or broad as compared
to, for example, dissemination through generic competition. However, these
findings underscore the ways in which exclusion can drive diffusion by
supporting cross-subsidization across market segments.
c. By Supporting Spillovers and Generic Entry, Enhancing Access to
Knowledge and Innovation
Another set of broad-based benefits comes not from patenting, but from
patents. Patents contain detailed technical descriptions and drawings through
which privately created knowledge “spills over” to the public. Unlike trade
shows, paid publications, and industry conferences, no entrance or membership
fees are required to access patents, which are stored on government websites.
Improvements to the public patent record, as with investments in public
knowledge generally, particularly benefit those who otherwise do not have
access to information. A study by Jeff Furman and his colleagues examined the
opening of patent libraries across the United States.216 They found that after a
patent library opened, the number of patents increased relative to control regions
and that the response was especially significant among young companies, 217
213
See generally Keith E. Maskus, Parallel Imports, 23 WORLD ECON. 1269, 1269–71 (2000) (providing
an overview of parallel trade).
214
Iain M. Cockburn, Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patents and the Global Diffusion of New
Drugs, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 136, 162 (2016).
215
Id. at 150, 152, 162.
216
Jeffrey L. Furman, Markus Nagler & Martin Watzinger, Disclosure and Subsequent Innovation:
Evidence from the Patent Depository Library Program 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
24660, 2018).
217
Id. at 3.
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leading to an increase in local business formation and job creation. 218 Though
that study considered the role of patents in facilitating information flows in the
pre-internet era, Jinhwan Kim and Kristen Valentine studied a more recent rule
change under which previously private patent applications started to release
publicly.219 The earlier availability of information increased research and
development (“R&D”) among firms whose rivals revealed more information,220
but reduced it among the revealers.221
When a patent expires, the invention enters the public domain and becomes
available for use by all, which typically lowers prices. The FDA has reported
that when the expiration of drug patents is followed by the introduction of six or
more competitors, the price of the product drops on average by 95%, although
the price decrease is less than half of that when there is only one competitor.222
***
Across these stories of individuals, upstarts, and outsiders, each of whom
have found success through invention, patents have played a few roles. A patent
can validate the originality of an underlying idea. The exclusive rights of a patent
also provide space to newcomers to develop their inventions with less fear of
being ripped off, encouraging investments in commercialization and market
expansion. The knowledge within patents spills over, and, when embodied in
product form, expands access to innovation. Once the patent has expired, the
invention can be used generically. Yet, the mere existence of these positive
mechanisms does not mean that they are meaningfully available. For new
innovators to gain from patenting, they must have the knowledge, wherewithal,
resources, and connections to file for patents and succeed in their applications.
To be able to learn from patents or benefit from their sale or licensing requires
the ability to find the appropriate patents and to locate parties with which to
transact. Benefiting from the patent system depends on having “invention
capital,” discussed further in the next section.

218

Id. at 4.
Jinhwan Kim & Kristen Valentine, The Innovation Consequences of Mandatory Patent Disclosures,
71 J. ACCT. & ECON. 1, 4 (2021) (studying the adoption of the “18-month” rule, according to which all patent
applications are published eighteen months after the earliest filing date rather than only upon patent grant,
pursuant to the American Inventor Protection Act of 1999).
220
Id. at 17.
221
Id.
222
RYAN CONRAD & RANDALL LUTTER, GENERIC COMPETITION AND DRUG PRICES: NEW EVIDENCE
LINKING GREATER GENERIC COMPETITION AND LOWER GENERIC DRUG PRICES 2–3 (2019) (explaining how the
expiration of drug patents, when followed by the introduction of six or more competitors, results in an average
price drop of 95%, and less than half of that when there is only one competitor).
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B. How Patents Intensify the Inequalities of Innovation
Just as patents can alleviate the inequalities of innovation, however, so too
can they intensify them. To understand how, it is useful to revisit a formulation
that is commonly used to explain economic inequality: when the value of
capital—property, stocks, or other holdings—rises faster than the economy at
large, the gap between those with and without capital widens. 223 As described
below, enhanced returns to “invention capital” play a similar role in intensifying
the inequalities of innovation.

223

THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 34 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.) (2017).
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Fig. 4: Patent Mechanisms that Alleviate the Inequalities of Innovation
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Lack of access to
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and network) required
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invention and
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Inequality of
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plaintiffs and defendants

High social and
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Inequality of Access
to Innovation

Extended terms and scope leading to suppression of
competition, access, and oversight

At the firm level, patent lobbyists and lawyers have helped successful
companies employ various strategies to extend their rights and avoid oversight,
limiting tax payments, opportunity, and access. On an individual level, a lack of
role models, positive associations with patents, and networks of legal counsel
have limited opportunities to participate in innovation. These dynamics have
tilted the patent system in favor of those with invention capital and away from
those without it.
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1. Increasing Economic Inequality Through Lobbying, Tax Avoidance, and
the Importance of Invention Capital
How might the patent system exacerbate economic inequality? The
subsections below describe a few mechanisms. Sophisticated firms have used
lobbying and intellectual-property-based tax practices to affect the upward
redistribution of rents. At the individual level, a lack of several forms of
invention capital—including knowledge of patenting and innovation career
paths, geographically proximate role models, and trust in and positive
associations with patenting—as well as the corporatization of invention, limit
broad-based sharing of the gains from invention.
a. At the Firm Level: Lobbying
Success in the patent system requires not only good ideas (what you know),
but also good connections (who you know) and money. Many of these
connections are paid for. Every year, patent-intensive firms pour resources into
lobbying; in 2020, the pharma and tech sectors together spent close to $1 million
per member of Congress.224 A number of studies have found lobbying to be
correlated with lower levels of economic mobility and entry.225
Pharmaceutical lobbying has been blamed for making drug prices the highest
in the world domestically and suppressing access to drug innovation
internationally. In the realm of international intellectual property, the perceived
undue influence of pharmaceutical lobbyists has elicited countermovements in
favor of greater flexibilities and substantive equality in trade laws. 226 Right
behind them, in terms of lobbying spending, are tech companies. While
somewhat less developed than “left-wing” populist critiques of the
pharmaceutical lobby, “right-wing” populist views227 decry the influence of an

224

Industries, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/industries (last visited Feb.
18, 2021) (showing that in 2020, those two industries spent approximately $473 million to lobby 535 members—
an average of $884,100 per member).
225
See, e.g., Aghion et al., Innovation and Top Income Inequality, supra note 175, at 4 (discussing how
lobbying activities typically help incumbents prevent new entry and thus, in locations with higher lobbying
intensity, innovativeness has a lower effect on social mobility).
226
See, e.g., Chon, supra note 70, at 2823 (proposing a “substantive equality” principle for warding off
intellectual property incursions on basic goods).
227
See generally JOHN B. JUDIS, THE POPULIST EXPLOSION: HOW THE GREAT RECESSION TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN POLITICS 12–17 (2016) (distinguishing between several forms of populism, including
right-wing populism—which is triadic because it pits the people against left-wing elites and the groups that they
have, from the perspective of right-wing populists, artificially propped up—and left-wing populism—which is
more binary because it is the people versus the elite establishment).
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industry that has prioritized, in various years, privacy, antitrust,228 and
intellectual property issues.229 According to “right-wing” populist views, large
tech companies have worked to weaken the patent system in order to engage in
the “efficient infringement”230 of others’ rights, to such an extent and at such
scale that the benefits of infringing outweigh the risks of getting caught.231
b. At the Firm Level: Patent “Rent Keeping”232 to Avoid Taxes
For large companies with multiple locations, patents have been used not only
to capture and shield rents, but also to hold on to them. Multinationals have
sheltered trillions of dollars by transferring patents and other forms of
intellectual property to hard-to-track subsidiaries or affiliates located in lower
tax jurisdictions.233 The affiliate then provides licenses for use of the intellectual
property in exchange for royalty revenue.234 The revenue is taxed at the lower
rate and the avoided taxes remain in the firm rather than being returned to the
government.235
While all firms seek to reduce their tax burdens, intellectual property assets
are more portable than assets like factories or plants, which require physical
228
AJ Dellinger, How the Biggest Tech Companies Spent Half a Billion Dollars Lobbying Congress,
FORBES (Apr. 30, 2019, 8:01 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ajdellinger/2019/04/30/how-the-biggesttech-companies-spent-half-a-billion-dollars-lobbying-congress/#270aa8d657c9 (describing privacy as tech
companies’ highest priority topic in 2018, and competition policy being one of Google’s priorities during that
same year).
229
See, e.g., Policy Position: Patents, INTERNET ASS’N, https://internetassociation.org/positions/patentreform/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2020); Policy Position: Copyright,
INTERNET ASS’N,
https://internetassociation.org/positions/copyright/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
230
See, e.g., Pat Choate, Patent Theft as a Business Strategy, HUFFPOST: THE BLOG (May 23, 2010,
5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pat-choate/patent-theft-as-a-busines_b_508780.html (describing
systemic infringement by the largest tech companies, including Cisco, Intel, IBM, Microsoft, and HP, resulting
in patent owners suing fifteen of the top tech companies over 740 times between 1996 and 2008, and patent
owners winning over $4 billion in damages).
231
Id.
232
In contrast with “rent seeking,” which describes the seeking out of wealth, generally using legal means,
without any reciprocal contribution of productivity, “rent keeping” refers to acting in order to avoid losing rents,
for example through tax avoidance schemes. See CFI Team, Rent-seeking, CORP. FIN. INST. (Feb. 9, 2021),
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/rent-seeking/.
233
Reuven Avi-Yonah, A Decisive Tax Defeat for the Multinationals?, AM. PROSPECT (June 29, 2020),
https://prospect.org/economy/decisive-tax-defeat-for-the-multinationals/ (describing transfer pricing as the
“most common and flagrant way big companies avoid taxes,” and identifying the tax revenue at stake as “at least
$2 billion and could be much more” on the basis of shifting $3 trillion in income generated by intangibles to
low-tax jurisdictions).
234
Andrew Blair-Stanek, Intellectual Property Law Solutions to Tax Avoidance, 62 UCLA L. REV. 2, 27
(2015).
235
Id. at 5.
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proximity to skilled labor or markets.236 The uniqueness of each individual
patent makes it difficult to value: the nature of innovation and the patents filed
is such that the distribution of patent values is highly skewed, ranging from “0
to several billion.”237 These features make patents “ideal for avoiding tax.”238
By transferring a patent from a high-tax jurisdiction to a low- or no-tax
jurisdiction for an artificially low price, the tax on the transfer is limited. If the
patent later turns out to be valuable, the royalties associated with the patent are
now safely in the low-tax jurisdiction, escaping taxation.239 The perfectly legal
tax avoidance strategies of firms, also known as “base erosion and profit
shifting” (“BEPS”) practices, have contributed to an estimated $100–240 billion
in avoided taxes annually.240 The divisions between tax and patent law, just like
the divisions between patent and antitrust law imposed by the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, described below, have historically contributed to a lack of effective
public law oversight, increasing firm-level inequality.241
c. At the Individual Level: A Lack of Knowledge, Role Models, Hostility,
and Cultural Factors
But just as some have used patents to prevent income redistribution at the
236

See Herman Mark Schwartz, Wealth and Secular Stagnation: The Role of Industrial Organization and
Intellectual Property Rights, 2 RSF: RUSSELL S AGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCIS. 226, 239 (2016) (“This kind of tax
evasion and avoidance could not be done as easily if firms were physically producing goods in facilities that
were integrated with IP production. Most tax authorities use a substantial presence test that would attach taxation
to the value created in that factory . . . .”).
237
DIETMAR HARHOFF, INNO-TEC16, MEASURING AND ESTIMATING PATENT VALUE: WIPO-OECD
WORKSHOP ON STATISTICS IN THE PATENT FIELD 16 (2003), http://www.oecd.org/science/inno/33882355.pdf.
238
Blair-Stanek, supra note 234, at 5.
239
Id.
240
Understanding Tax Avoidance, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (last visited June 23, 2021).
241
Reforms initiated by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) would
address corporate tax avoidance using transparency and coordination through so-called “country-by-country
reporting” that requires multinationals to disclose the global allocation of the income, profit, taxes paid, and
economic activity among the jurisdictions in which they operate. Action 13 Country-by-Country Reporting,
OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/action13/ (last visited June 23, 2022) (“[T]he second set of
aggregated . . . data from CbCRs was . . . released in July 2021[,] . . . provid[ing] information on the global tax
and economic activities of nearly 6,000 multinational enterprise groups . . . operating across more than 100
jurisdictions worldwide.”). The Biden Administration has also introduced a tax plan to “stop[] unfair and
wasteful profit shifting to tax havens” by increasing the global minimum tax on income from intangible assets
(“Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income,” or “GILTI” for short) earned by foreign affiliates of U.S. companies
from 10.5% to 21%, and eliminating an exemption on the first 10% of return on assets in foreign countries.
FACT SHEET: The American Jobs Plan, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/; see also Annmarie ConboyDePasquale, Reese Goldsmith, Lori Harju, Charlie Iovino, Timothy Jackson, Gregory Janssen, Michael Marn,
Radha Mohan & Russ Sullivan, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, American Jobs Plan Analysis, JDSUPRA (Apr.
1, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/american-jobs-plan-analysis-7875465/.
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firm level, a number of mechanisms have also operated to prevent uptake of the
benefits of invention at the individual level. For individuals who successfully
commercialize their own inventions, the act of patenting turns labor into capital,
providing an asset from which personal wealth can be built and passed down.
But even assuming a sufficient educational background, the “invention capital”
needed to independently pursue an innovation career and patent successfully is
not necessarily distributed equally across society.
If you take a group of high-achieving third graders and follow them for
decades, what will you find? Raj Chetty and his colleagues recently carried out
this exercise, tracking kids in the top 10% of their respective standardized math
tests scores throughout their careers.242 They found that when they compared
kids of equal intelligence, the wealthiest kids were ten times more likely to
become inventors than kids from families with below-median incomes.243
Talented female, Hispanic, and black students were also much less likely to
invent than their white and Asian male counterparts.244 But rather than pointing
to factors like financial incentives or STEM education, the study identified
differences in “exposure to innovation during childhood” as the key source of
variation.245 A lack of mentors and role models, particularly of demographic
similarity (e.g., female inventors for females), “explain[ed] why talented
children in low-income families, minorities, and women are significantly less
likely to become inventors.”246 Their findings support the idea that one’s zip
code, exposure to patenting, role models, and social connections play an
important role in determining who does and does not invent.247 For many
talented individuals, whether in rural, disadvantaged, or underrepresented
neighborhoods, knowledge of innovation and invention pathways is simply
lacking.
The finding that inventing appears to favor the rich and innovation savvy is
challenging to those who believe that the patent system operates as a
meritocracy. However, in context, it is nothing new. Like other professions
passed down between generations, a culture of inventing and patenting is a form
of knowledge capital that functions as an inheritance.248 The inventor-successors
242
Alex Bell, Raj Chetty, Xavier Jaravel, Neviana Petkova & John Van Reenen, Who Becomes an
Inventor in America? The Importance of Exposure to Innovation, 134 Q.J. ECON. 647, 650, 674 n.18 (2019).
243
Id. at 649.
244
Id. at 666–67, 672–73.
245
Id. at 709.
246
Id.
247
Id. at 709–10.
248
See, e.g., Aghion et al., Innovation and Top Income Inequality, supra note 175, at 3 (finding, based on
data from 1880 to 1940, a positive correlation between a father’s education and the likelihood of patenting).
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of Franklin Ball, the steam engine inventor, included his son, Frederick,
grandson, Tom, and eventually his great-grandson, Jeremy,249 who continued
inventing in similar areas.250
But where does a lack of knowledge, role models, and trusted connections,
all forms of invention capital, by women and underrepresented minorities come
from? In the antebellum South, although enslaved people faced restrictions that
prevented them from patenting their inventions,251 white slave masters were not
stopped from “tak[ing] undue credit” or attempting to patent the machines and
other inventions of slaves as their own.252 Accounts of men taking credit for the
inventions of women cover technologies that range from the paper bag, to
wireless communication, to light pulses, to the structure of DNA.253 The rules of
patent ownership historically have meant that the inventions of women and
slaves flowed to white, land-owning men, not necessarily the true inventors or
their heirs.254 There are now no restrictions on who can be named an inventor.
However, it remains that in many cases, the gains to inventors from inventing
are limited. That is because, as discussed in Part I, the vast majority of inventing
happens within corporations where patent rights are ceded to the company. Even
249
See ply33 Comment to carbking, Penberthy (Ball & Ball) Carburetor Information Wanted, ANTIQUE
AUTO. CLUB AM. (Apr. 13, 2018), https://forums.aaca.org/topic/307916-penberthy-ball-ball-carburetorinformation-wanted/.
250
Id. (explaining that, by this time, Franklin Ball’s grandson invented automotive rather than steam
engines).
251
See Brian L. Frye, Invention of a Slave, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 181, 183 (2018) (explaining the
antebellum Patent Act, which “effectively precluded” slaves from patenting inventions).
252
Shontavia Jackson Johnson, The Colorblind Patent System and Black Inventors, LANDSLIDE VOL. II
NO. 4 (2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/201819/march-april/colorblind-patent-system-black-inventors/.
253
Leslie Regan Shade, Book Reviews, 13 CANADIAN WOMAN STUD. 112, 114 (1993) (reviewing DAVID
F. NOBLE, A WORLD WITHOUT WOMEN: THE C HRISTIAN CLERICAL CULTURE OF WESTERN SCIENCE (1992);
JUDY WAJCMAN, FEMINIST CONFRONTS TECHNOLOGY (1991); GILL KIRKUP & LAURIE SMITH KELLER,
INVENTING WOMEN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GENDER (1992); ANNE L. MACDONALD, FEMININE
INGENUITY: WOMEN AND INVENTION IN AMERICA (1992)) (recounting, for example, the fight over the invention
of the paper bag by Margaret Knight); see also Krystyna Chávez, 19 Groundbreaking Discoveries by Women
that Were Credited to Men, MARIE CLAIRE (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.marieclaire.com/culture/g5026/femalediscoveries-credited-to-men/ (describing inventions and discoveries made by women—ranging from wireless
communication by Hedy Lamarr to radio pulses by Jocelyn Bell Burnell—for which men claimed the credit);
Joanna Rothkopf, How One Man Tried to Write Women out of CRISPR, the Biggest Biotech Innovation in
Decades, JEZEBEL (Jan. 20, 2016, 11:45 AM), https://jezebel.com/how-one-man-tried-to-write-women-out-ofcrispr-the-big-1753996281 (describing the exclusion of Rosalind Franklin from credit for the structure of DNA
in favor of her colleagues James Watson and Francis Crick, as well as the “significant[] minimiz[ation]” of the
role Jennifer Doudna’s lab had in advancing the technology).
254
Johnson, supra note 252; see also Kara W. Swanson, Race and Selective Legal Memory: Reflections
on Invention of a Slave, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (2020) (recounting the complicated history of slave
owners attempting to patent the inventions of their slaves).
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in the absence of agreements, equitable doctrines tend to favor employers. 255
Cultural factors in combination with employment law may be deterring
certain groups from participating in inventing. A report by the Smithsonian
Center’s Lemelson Center for the Study of Invention and Innovation recently
found:
Traditional definitions of invention and innovation are too
narrow. Conventional understandings of these terms, steeped in
Western capitalistic outlooks, prioritize profitability, efficiency,
autonomy, newness, and ownership. A Black view of invention
and innovation, however, includes an emphasis on aiding the
community, advancing artistic expression, repurposing existing
resources, and promoting cooperation.256
Lateef Mtima has made a similar critique of intellectual property—that it
should not solely be viewed as an engine for the economy, but that, under the
broader rubric of intellectual property social justice theory, it should instead be
thought of as “providing material inducements toward the achievement of
broader social utility and social justice goals.”257
That diverse inventors may not see themselves or their interests advanced
within this scheme is reinforced by a recent guide to “best practices in diversity”
in invention geared at company in-house counsel.258 According to the guide,
“[t]he term ‘inventor’ may be unrelatable to diverse inventors, in part because
the celebrated historical inventors from U.S. history tend to be non-diverse.”259
The guide advises companies to reframe “inventorship” as problem-solving.260
However, to the extent that innovation workers see corporate invention
processes—which typically assign all rights to the employer according to the
hired to invent doctrine261—as primarily extractive in nature, similar to the
255

See supra Section I.C.1. (discussing the hired to invent and shop right doctrines.)
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256

50

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:1

historical appropriation of ideas, the issue may be more about the alignment of
interests and values than semantics. As such, a number of factors may explain
why patenting-based pathways to prosperity are narrower than is desirable.
Downright hostility and racial violence have also historically suppressed
invention.262 Professor and Federal Reserve Board of Governors member Lisa
Cook has documented how riots, lynchings, and the passage of segregation laws
have historically been followed by an exodus of black inventors from
patenting.263 Treating the rise in mass violence between 1870 and 1940 as a
historical experiment, she finds that the Tulsa massacre in 1921 and similar
violent acts contributed to a loss of more than 1,100 patents, with only 726 actual
patents among black inventors over this period.264 A culture of hostility has also
been responsible for qualified individuals leaving, rather than staying and
patenting in, their chosen STEM careers and roles. In their report on women
inventors and patents, the Institute for Women’s Policy Research found
“[s]exism and gender discrimination in the workplace, particularly in STEM
fields, along with a lack of family friendly workplace policies,” reduced
opportunities for collaboration and drove women out of STEM occupations.265
The Kapor Center’s “Tech Leavers Study” examined why people, particularly
black, Latinx, and women, left their jobs in tech. The top reason for leaving,
even more than a better opportunity, was “unfair treatment,” including
stereotyping, bullying, public humiliation, and embarrassment.266 Respondents
specifically cited microaggressions, unwanted sexual attention, isolation, and
persistent biases as reasons for departing.267
2. Increasing Inequality of Opportunity Through Unequal Access to
Patenting and High Costs
To participate and benefit from invention and innovation requires navigating
the legal process of getting a patent, typically with the help of a trusted lawyer
or agent. Bringing or defending against a patent assertion also requires the help
DUKE SCI., TECH. & INNOVATION SERIES 5–6 (2006).
262
See, e.g., Lisa D. Cook, Violence and Economic Activity: Evidence from African American Patents,
1870–1940, 19 J. ECON. GROWTH 221, 242–44 (2014).
263
See id. at 242.
264
Id. at 222, 224 n.3.
265
JESSICA MILLI, EMMA WILLIAMS-B ARON, MEIKA BERLAN, JENNY XIA & BARBARA GAULT, EQUITY
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(2016),
https://iwpr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/C448-Equity-in-Innovation.pdf.
266
See ALLISON SCOTT, FREADA KAPOR KLEIN & URIRIDIAKOGHENE ONOVAKPURI, TECH LEAVERS
STUDY (2017), https://www.kaporcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/TechLeavers2017.pdf.
267
Id.
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of legal counsel. But differences in access to and ability to pay counsel have
translated into differences in opportunity to participate in and gain from
innovation and invention.
a. At the Firm Level: Strategic Lawyering to Extend Patent Term and
Scope
The crux of the patent bargain is that patent rights are bounded along at least
the dimensions of time and scope. Patent rights expire twenty years from the
date of filing, after which time the invention enters the public domain.268 Even
when a patent is in force, the exclusive right is not endless, but, as with real
property, is defined by the “boundaries” of the invention. 269 But through
strategic lawyering, patent applicants have been able to stretch these limits of
time and scope. For example, attempting to extend the life of one’s patent270
beyond what others get is an old game. For centuries, patent owners have lobbied
Congress to get the duration of their patents extended. 271 In 1996, the
pharmaceutical firm G.D. Searle got its patent on the drug Daypro extended
when a provision was “quietly inserted” into an emergency budget bill that was
passed to avert a government shutdown.272 In 2020, a bill was proposed that
would extend the term of COVID-19 drug patents by ten years.273 It did not
advance.274 A more reliable way of extending scope and term has been to

268
35 U.S.C. § 154 (stating that a patent may expire sooner than twenty years after the date of its filing if
its owner fails to pay the requisite maintenance fees).
269
Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 524–26 (2010) (likening patent
to real property “boundaries”).
270
The same is true of copyrights. See Lawrence Lessig, Congress’ Latest Move to Extend Copyright
Protections Is Misguided, WIRED (May 18, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/congress-latestmove-to-extend-copyright-protection-is-misguided/ (describing the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
as the “11th extension in the prior 40 years”).
271
See Richard M. Cooper, Legislative Patent Extensions, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 59, 60–62 (1993)
(describing patent extensions from the early 1800s to the 1980s).
272
Adriel Bettelheim, Drugmakers Under Siege, 9 CQ RESEARCHER 753, 766 (Sept. 3, 1999),
https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher////document.php?id=cqresrre1999090300; The Pink Sheet, Searle
Daypro Patent Extension Bill Introduced by Sen. Simon, Co-sponsored by Sen. Hatch, SCRIP (Jan. 8, 1996),
https://scrip.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/PS027467/Searle-Daypro-patent-extension-bill-introduced-bySen-Simon-cosponsored-by-Sen-Hatch (citing the long delays in regulatory approvals as leading to the need for
the bill).
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Celeste Alvarez, James Mullen III & Desmond O’Sullivan, Bill Proposes 10 Additional Years for
COVID-19 Inventions, JDSUPRA (July 29, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/bill-proposes-10additional-years-for-43324/.
274
See S.3630—Facilitating Innovation to Fight Coronavirus
Act, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/3630/text?r=1&s=1 (last visited Aug. 16, 2021)
(showing the bill as not getting out of Committee).
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navigate the complex cluster of rules and doctrines that permit patentees to file
for successive “continuation” applications. Such applications allow inventors to
get the benefit of an earlier filed application, based on the same specifications
but claiming different subject matter.275 From a single patent specification, the
patent owner can get multiple patents, though their subject matter must be
supported by the original application.276
As described in Part I, naloxone was first introduced in 1961. But while the
basic chemistry has been known for decades, the creators of the Evzio applicator
have secured additional patent protections reportedly until 2034, 277 over sixty
years after discovery of the drug. Although the average number of patents
covering a drug is less than four,278 manufacturer Kaléo has boasted having over
twenty patents just on the Evzio applicator.279 A closer look reveals that not only
are the patents overlapping, rather than distinct, but that nine of the inventions
have the exact same name and are part of the same patent “family,” 280 covering
modified versions of the same invention with slightly different dates of
expiration.281 The ability to get patents over incremental improvements, as
described in Part I, was important for stimulating development of the new
applicator. But the piling-on of patent filings suggest more may be going on.
While developing a new drug is estimated to cost at least between $1–2.8
billion,282 Kaléo’s public filings suggest that it only spent a small fraction of that
amount to develop a novel applicator.283 Though in the absence of a
counterfactual it is hard to be sure that fewer lives were saved than would have
275
This is authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 120, which entitles later-filed applications to the benefits of the
earlier-filed application on which it depends if certain conditions are met. 35 U.S.C. § 120.
276
Cesare Righi & Timothy Simcoe, Patent Examiner Specialization 4–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 23913, 2017).
277
Weissman & Wen, supra note 113.
278
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? Follow-On
Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 300 (2010).
279
Kaléo Announces the Award of its 100th Patent, KALÉO (Jan. 25, 2016), https://kaleo.com/pressrelease/kaleo-announces-the-award-of-its-100th-patent/.
280
See Medicament Delivery Device Having an Electronic Circuit System, U.S. Patent No. 9,238,108 B2;
US-9238108-B2 (issued Jan. 19, 2016) (showing nine patent publications to Kaléo, including the “Medicament
Delivery Device Having an Electronic Circuit System”).
281
Id. (showing expiration dates that include 2027 (for U.S. Patent No. 9,238,108) and 2026 (for U.S.
Patent No. 10,076,611)).
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Jonathan Gardner, New Estimate Puts Cost to Develop a New Drug at $1B, Adding to Long-Running
Debate, BIOPHARMA DIVE (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/new-drug-cost-researchdevelopment-market-jama-study/573381/ (describing competing studies).
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Alex Wang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Government Patent Use to Address the Rising Cost of Naloxone:
28 U.S.C. § 1498 and Evzio, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 472, 476 (2018) (contrasting Kaléo’s claim that it has spent
“more than $100 million in the research, development and commercialization of Evzio” with public filings that
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been saved under different conditions, the company’s dramatic price reductions
under public pressure suggest high margins.284
The strategy of applying for large numbers of patents to raise barriers to
competitors is called “thicketing,” because it requires others to cut through a
“thicket” of patents, which are often hard to track, before they can enter the
market.285 The patents may not be novel or even valid. Robin Feldman has found
that 78% of drug patents are not for new drugs, but rather cover existing ones.286
When so-called “secondary” patents are challenged, they are only upheld 32%
of the time, while active-ingredient patents are upheld 92% of the time.287
The stakes can be considerable. For example, in the case of the blockbuster
arthritis drug Humira, the most successful (remuneratively) drug of all-time,288
a major reason prices have remained high is, in the words of a district court,
“Humira-related patents (more than a hundred) make it difficult (if not
impossible) to sell competing drugs.”289 Although patents are supposed to cover
only new-to-the-world (novel) inventions, 90% of the 132 patents drugmaker
AbbVie received for Humira were issued twelve years after the drug was first
marketed.290 They covered not only AbbVie’s drug, but also “ingredients and
formulations that AbbVie anticipated its competition might seek to employ.”291
It is notable that to get patents over these variants, AbbVie was not required to
have actually made them—the sanctioning of “prophetic examples” by the
Patent Office means that companies can disclose “made-up experiments and
fictional data in patents” and have it “treated as equivalent to factual data,”
according to Janet Freilich, who has studied the practice in depth. 292 The ability
to pursue continuation patents was a cornerstone of AbbVie’s strategy: in an
independent analysis performed for this paper of the patents covering Humira
disclosed by AbbVie in the litigation, the vast majority were found to be
continuations.293 As noted by the Northern District of Illinois, a single patent
284
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application covering Humira “serve[d] as the basis for twenty-two continuation
applications, all of which would have been barred by prior art but-for their ability
to relate back.”294 As the court also found, “AbbVie’s 100-plus Humira-related
patents can be traced back to twenty root patents, forming twenty patent [family]
trees.”295
The firm’s strategy has been to extend and, to some degree, obscure: in the
words of the company CFO, as revealed during an antitrust lawsuit currently
pending in the Seventh Circuit, the firm was “‘obviously not very specific about
what’ it was putting into its ‘very robust collection of IP’ because ‘with a product
as important and as attractive as Humira, you do everything you can on the IP
front to ensure that you’ve protected it to the best you can.’”296 AbbVie’s
strategy was “to ‘make it more difficult for a biosimilar to follow behind.’”297
The strategy has worked—though a number of AbbVie’s patents have proven to
be invalid, each challenge is costly.298 Rather than try to cut through the thicket,
competitors have, in some cases, settled with AbbVie, translating into delayed
dates of generic entry.299 Humira is a uniquely valuable drug, and it is no surprise
that AbbVie took the steps that it did to protect its rights. However, the use of
continuations to extend the value of patents is not unique: a paper by Mark
Lemley and Judge Kimberly Moore found that 43% of biotechnology and
organic chemistry patents were continuation patents, rather than covering new
molecules.300 In an independent analysis of utility patents litigated in 2019, I
found 51% were found to be continuation patents.301
Filing for successive patents has translated into extended exclusivity, the

continuation or continuation in part; and nine were divisional patents).
294
Humira, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 823 (referring to U.S. Patent Application 10/22.140).
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Id. at 824 (citations omitted).
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Id. (citations omitted).
298
See id. at 826 (“[Competitors felt] that they had to enter into the settlement agreements because their
only other choice[] [was] years of expensive litigation over an impossible patent thicket . . . .”).
299
See Noah Higgins-Dunn, AbbVie Repeatedly Hiked Humira, Imbruvica Prices and Abused Patents to
Keep Competitors at Bay: Report, FIERCE PHARMA (May 18, 2021, 12:00 PM),
https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/abbvie-repeatedly-raised-prices-for-humira-imbruvica-and-abused-u-spatent-system-to-extend (describing Congressional probe into AbbVie’s actions to delay generic entry for
Humira, including settling with competitors challenging AbbVie’s patents).
300
Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63,
86 tbl.2 (2004) (showing a table of Continuation Filing by Technology Centers, at “TC1600: Biotechnology and
Organic Chemistry”).
301
See Colleen Chien, 2019 Litigated Patents and Continuity Claims, GOOGLEDOCS,
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/16jy7bk9RJx9PvVFC5pozXUMqoJy8O5XDZuFhigPdchQ/edit?usp=s
haring.h (last visited Aug. 19, 2021).
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extension of patent life through “evergreening.”302 Filing for many continuation
patents in order to cover the products of competitors has created “impassable”
patent thickets for competitors.303 These tactics, perfectly legal under patent law,
have helped pharmaceutical firms reap large profits,304 while also arguably
supporting product innovation. They have also been used by holders of patents
covering technical standards. Tim Simcoe and Cesare Righi have found the use
of continuation procedures to opportunistically pursue “new patents that are
infringed by already-published standards” to be “widespread.”305
Do such tactics, even though allowed under patent law, amount to anticompetitive behavior? The allegation in Humira was that AbbVie’s patent
actions to box out competition violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and
state laws.306 But the scope of antitrust oversight of patenting behavior has been
limited by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which immunizes behavior that is
legal under patent law from antitrust liability unless it constitutes “a pattern of
baseless, repetitive claims.”307 In the dismissal of antitrust claims against
AbbVie concerning Humira, the court found that though AbbVie had failed in a
large share of its applications and asserted patents, it succeeded in a majority of
them,308 undercutting the finding of such a pattern. But it is unclear whether this
interpretation actually captures the anti-competitive harms that are associated
with continuation patents. This is in part because the intended purpose of
continuation patents in the scheme of the patent system—and also how far
AbbVie has departed from it—are not well-appreciated due to low public
understanding of these administrative options.
b. At the Individual Level: Knowledge of Patenting and Access to
Trusted, Trustworthy, and High-Quality Patent Attorneys
That the system tends to favor those with the best lawyers and patent
portfolios, not necessarily those with the best ideas or most talent, applies not
only to firms, but to individuals as well. While some features of the patent
302
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Humira, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 845.
304
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DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEALS (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-1840.pdf (finding that from 2006 to 2015, large drug company “margin[s] fluctuated between 15 and 20 percent”
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305
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306
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307
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system are designed to promote broad participation by all, other features, this
subsection argues, cut the other way. As has been discussed at length
elsewhere,309 patenting is expensive, putting it out of reach of some.310 In
addition, the “corporatization” of R&D means that firms, rather than individuals,
are applying for most of the patents.311 But for innovators or entrepreneurs—
even within firms312—to even know to apply for a patent in the first place takes
knowledge that patenting is possible, a sense that it is worthwhile, and a belief
that one will get a fair shot during the patenting process. It also requires a
relationship with a patent agent or lawyer who can vet an invention for its
patentability (or lack thereof), and, as appropriate, file the patent and pursue it
to completion.
Applying for a patent takes a certain level of awareness that, in many cases,
is lacking. But even to be able to apply for a patent, conditional upon having a
patentable idea and the organization to pursue it, an applicant must work with a
bar-qualified patent agent or attorney, or the applicant must file pro se. At
various points in history, segregationist laws have restricted access to patent
lawyers313 and removed black examiners from the civil service.314 While no rules
currently explicitly bar women, African-Americans, or others from becoming
patent attorneys, the patent bar remains overwhelmingly male315 and, until
recently, the patent examination corps included few black examiners. 316 This is
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ed. 2006)).
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314
Id. at 237 n.41.
315
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patent agents were women); see Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Gender Diversity in the Patent Bar, 14 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 67, 80 tbl.2 (2014) (reporting that, among agents and attorneys with identifiable gender,
about 20% were women).
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in part because to be eligible to even sit for the patent bar generally requires a
science, technology, or engineering degree.317 Because of their
underrepresentation among STEM, engineering, and computer science
graduates, women and minorities are disproportionately excluded from sitting
for the patent bar, a number of commentators have noted.318 When Sara Blakely,
the founder of the billion-dollar women’s undergarment empire Spanx, got her
start, she could not find “a single female patent attorney . . . in the whole state
of Georgia” to file a patent application.319 Research by Abhay Aneja and his
colleagues suggests that the lack of access to high-quality patent attorneys
contributes to the “gender patent granting gap”—the lower success rates of
comparable patent applications submitted by women to the US Patent Office.320
Though patent applications by women are abandoned to a higher degree than
applications by men in response to early-stage rejections, the difference is
reduced when “women-led applications have either the backing of firms or highquality legal representation, consistent with a potential role for institutional
support in mitigating gender disparities.”321 Uneven access to quality legal
counsel may also explain in part why, as explored in the next Part, independent
inventors and small firms are considerably less likely to succeed on their
applications than large firms.
When independent and small inventors do not have trusted connections that
can help them navigate the patenting process, they are more vulnerable to
unscrupulous patent lawyers and scammers. Although only a small fraction of
patents become valuable products, the enthusiasm of inventors makes them
susceptible to unrealistic marketing claims or expectations, at times with ruinous
results.322 In East of Eden, John Steinbeck describes the main character:
[Samuel] developed a very bad patent habit, a disease many men
suffer from. He invented [] part of a [] machine . . . . The patent

administrative staff).
317
Letter from Eric Goldman, Professor, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. L., Jess Miers, Student, Santa Clara Univ.
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attorney ate up his little profit . . . [and the money] was drained off in
patents. The Hamilton children went barefoot, . . . and food was
sometimes scarce . . . .323

In recent years, so-called “invention promotion firms” that promise to
evaluate, patent, and market inventions in exchange for substantial sums of
money upfront have flourished. In 2017, the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) initiated a suit against “World Patent Marketing,” a company in Florida
it said had “bilked thousands of consumers out of millions of dollars.”324 The
company promised inventors lucrative licensing or manufacturing agreements
but “fail[ed] to fulfill almost every promise [made].”325 In 2011, the FTC set up
a consumer awareness site and hotline to warn independent innovators of
“dishonest invention promoters [who] lie about the profit potential of your
invention to get you to pay for expensive, but often useless, services.” 326 Poor
access to quality patent attorneys exacerbates inequalities in opportunities to
innovate and invent.
c. At the Firm and Individual Level: By Leveraging High Litigation Costs
and Large Patent Portfolios
Well-resourced companies enjoy advantages not only when they file for
individual patents, but also when they strategically acquire and enforce or defend
against patent assertions. As defendants, small firms have vulnerabilities that
their larger rivals do not—they are often fighting for survival, less experienced,
and less likely to have staff dedicated to legal matters, much less patent legal
matters.327 This makes them an easy target for certain types of “patent assertion
entities,” known more colloquially as “trolls”—special purpose firms that
strategically use their patents to sue and support litigation rather than the
development or commercialization of products.328 Although trolls target firms
of all sizes, the impact of threatened litigation on young or small firms that are
on the rise, especially when they are strategically timed, for example on the eve

323
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See Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 476 (2014)
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of an initial public offering, can be more devastating.329 This makes settlements
an attractive option.
Suits by large companies, or “bullies,” against smaller rivals can be just as,
if not more, damaging because the interests transcend obtaining a financial
settlement. In response to a survey conducted among venture capitalists about
patent litigation against startups, for example, respondents cited, “[b]ig company
scorched earth tactics . . . [meant to] scare a smaller company and make it hard
to raise funding,” to “drain the start-up of cash to remove a competitor,” “to
squash a thinly funded competitor,” or “to shut [the] company down.”330
Such “bully” suits name small companies as defendants, but the high cost of
litigation is bad for small innovators as patent plaintiffs as well. This is because
when large firms copy but “hold out” and refuse to negotiate with patentholders,
engaging in “efficient infringement,”331 it is difficult for smaller firms to get
their day in court due to the cost of assertion, the high risk of countersuit based
on one of the many patents in a larger competitor’s portfolio, and the demise of
automatic injunctions to prevailing patentees.332 Patent plaintiffs must put at risk
not only the legal cost of the assertion, but also the patent, which is susceptible
to validity challenges in court as well as at the USPTO, through post-grant
administrative challenges.333 Serial defensive challenges, in which single or
multiple parties file successive challenges to the same patent, wearing down and
draining the patentee of resources,334 also smack of abuse. They highlight the

329
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tensions, as discussed in Part I, between the interests of consumers who stand to
benefit from broader access to inventions covered by patents that are invalidated,
and the interests of small or upstart patent holding firms.
Even in the absence of lawsuits, large patent portfolios may have a deterrent
effect on small firms. Studying patent portfolio accumulation, George Day and
Michael Schuster have found that startup inventors reduce their research and
development expenditures when faced with growing numbers of patents in a
field.335 In a related paper, Bronwyn Hall and her coauthors have reached similar
conclusions about the deterrent impact of patent thickets on entry and investment
based on an analysis of data from U.K. firms, but also find that the answer
depends on the nature of the technology.336 Reduced investment and entry are
not necessarily welfare-reducing in areas of growing complexity, where entry
can be excessive and lead to “business stealing” when a new firm merely shifts,
rather than increases, customer demand.337 But when patent thickets discourage
entry in new technology areas, there is a greater risk that original, “outside the
box” ideas will be lost.338 In these ways, sophisticated parties have exploited the
high cost of litigation, as well as their ability to amass large portfolios of patents,
to dampen opportunity as well as access to the innovations of new firms.
3. Decreasing Access by Avoiding Government Oversight
Another way in which firms limit oversight and downstream access to
innovation is through sharp practices with respect to government-funded
innovation. Although patentees are generally free to do what they want with their
inventions, taxpayer-funded inventions are different and subject to special
contractual and statutory safeguards. In the case of the COVID-19 vaccine, for
example, the U.S. Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority
(“BARDA”) struck a deal with Moderna to reimburse it up to $1 billion in
research and development costs339 and, in exchange, get priority for the purchase
of the vaccine at a lower price.340 The federal government also has the statutory
documenting a similar pattern for other leading filers).
335
Day & Schuster, supra note 285, at 154.
336
Bronwyn H. Hall, Christian Helmers & Georg von Graevenitz, Technology Entry in the Presence of
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339
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right, under certain circumstances, to take steps to expand access to the fruits of
government-funded research.341 As was referred to at the beginning of this
Article, the Bayh-Dole Act authorizes the exercise of so-called “[m]arch-in”
rights according to which, under certain limited circumstances, the government
can provide licenses to third parties to make the invention more widely
available.342 Even if rarely exercised, the presence of this powerful tool serves
as an accountability check on government-funded inventions.
But for the mechanism of government oversight to actually broaden access
to “government inventions,” such inventions must be identifiable in the first
place. Unfortunately, compliance with government interest disclosures and coinventorship is often less than robust.343 For example, in the case of Moderna’s
COVID-19 vaccine, two separate government agencies, the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency (“DARPA”) and the National Institutes of Health
(“NIH”), initiated investigations based on the potential nondisclosure of
government ownership interests in Moderna patents.344 Following this
heightened scrutiny, Moderna pledged to not enforce its COVID-19 patents.345
At the time of this writing, Moderna and the NIH remained engaged in a bitter
inventorship dispute over government-funded mRNA patents.346 While prompt
correction of the record would be an appropriate remedy for a good-faith
omission of a government inventor, deliberately leaving off an inventor would
result in the patent being held unenforceable under the doctrine of inequitable
conduct.347 But even when government ownership information is disclosed, it is
often strategically delayed or poorly integrated into the patent record. 348
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***
Although far from comprehensive, the foregoing describes some of the
tactics firms have used to capture advantage in and through the patent system.
Though the patent system is supposed to balance the interests of rights holders
and implementers, the complexity and cost of the system advantage those with
the resources and wherewithal to use the system strategically relative to others,
regardless of which side they are on. As firms with invention capital use it to
enrich themselves, the inequalities of innovation are intensified. Though
“gaming the system” to gain advantage is not illegal, nor particularly new,349 nor
unique to patents,350 it does suppress competition and therefore certain kinds of
opportunity and access.
This Part has described the mechanisms by which the patent system can both
alleviate and extend the inequalities of innovation. Viewing them together
underscores the inherent tensions, like those identified in the previous Part,
between a number of patent doctrines, each of which may plausibly advance
egalitarian interests. As described earlier, increasing access to an invention
through its diffusion, for example to a different country, is supported by the
ability of the innovator firm to price discriminate, which in turn depends on “first
sale” or exhaustion policies. While a policy of limited or “national” exhaustion
permits price discrimination and encourages innovator companies to make
investments to enter new markets with the security that offering lower prices
there will not cannibalize sales in the original market, a policy of expansive or
“international” exhaustion favors consumers in the original market who can in
theory avail themselves of the lower prices now offered in the other market (e.g.,
U.S. consumers benefiting from lower Canadian drug prices). Similarly, the
ability to file continuation patents can boost the value of an individual patent,
may lead to greater intellectual property “empowerment” for its owner, and can
result in even greater availability of the invention but, ultimately, produce
higher-priced access for some consumers. Giving more rights or requiring
remuneration to employee-inventors, as many countries in Europe do, would
shift the balance of the benefits of invention toward labor and away from capital,
but also introduce significant transaction costs to be passed on to consumers,
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limiting access. Adjustments to the law in the face of such tradeoffs must be
finely calibrated and carefully weighted.

III. PATENT REFORMS TO EXPAND INNOVATION AND EQUITY
This Part discusses several ideas for narrowing the inequalities of innovation
through patent law and policy. In so doing, it is worth emphasizing that these
ideas serve as a complement to, not a substitute for, laws and policies 351 that may
more directly address each of the inequalities of innovation. As to economic
inequality, for example, even if all people patented at the rate of children from
wealthy white families, mechanically speaking, the number of inventors
annually would still be a tiny fraction of the number of Americans whose income
would be impacted by an increase in the minimum wage.352 Similarly, the
number of people that could potentially take advantage of improved STEM
education is much greater than, for example, the fraction of innovators that
would benefit from tweaks to patent filing protocols. In addition, not everyone
can or will choose to respond to patent incentives,353 no matter how expanded
the opportunity. At base, the notion that intellectual property rights should serve
to advance distributive justice should not detract from the “actual” tools of
redistribution like taxation, labor, or other welfare policies.
What patent law is good for, however, is stimulating innovation, at least
certain kinds,354 and spurring the diffusion of that innovation, potentially
enriching innovators along the way. What it can also offer are ideas that are
grounded in the generative nature of innovation: in many cases, the hard part is
coming up with the innovation (e.g., a drug or new algorithm), but copies are
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cheap and virtually non-rivalrous. The law and administration of patents can
support licensing and ability to price discriminate freely, supporting abundant
access. Patents are also public franchises, not private rights, and the patent
system directly interfaces with public interest laws and doctrines focused on
improving the lot of the worst-off. Taking advantage of these features of patent
law and policy, below this Article discusses ideas for leveling up, and not just
leveling the playing field with respect to opportunity and access to innovation
through institutional and administrative interventions in patents.
Before discussing a few proposals, it is worth returning to the normative and
practical question of whether ensuring absolute equality in innovation, as
compared to improving conditions of the worst-off, should be the primary goal.
As previously discussed, in a primarily market-based innovation system based
on incentives, some level of inequality is unavoidable. While alternative means
for encouraging innovation, such as prizes and grants, exist, and indeed coexist,
with the patent system, as a recent comprehensive review of the literature found,
“no system is ideal.”355 Even in contexts when theoretical comparisons of the
strengths or weaknesses of each policy tool are possible, the lack of a true
counterfactual makes conclusions hard to draw.
The goal of optimizing conditions for the “worst-off” has its own challenges,
principally that it requires empirical estimations that are unavailable in many
cases. For example, how might one trade off the short- and long-term welfare
impacts associated with international vs. domestic exhaustion? Likewise,
comparing the interests of the “worst-off” consumers and the “worst-off”
inventors, in a Pareto-optimal context, where improving things for one group
comes at the cost of the other,356 is not exactly straightforward.
This Part seeks to avoid some of these difficult questions by focusing on
“win-win” or, at least, “win-no-lose” interventions, aimed at expanding
opportunity and access. Equality still has a role to play when deciding how to
allocate limited resources among competing priorities. In the face of disparities
in inventing and access, the narrowing of gaps represents a guidepost for
developing and evaluating reforms and advancing equality.

355

Michael Abramowicz, Prize and Reward Alternatives to Intellectual Property, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF I NTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 350, 373 (Ben Depoorter & Peter S. Menell
eds., 2019) (including, among the challenges of administering prize or grant systems: administration costs and
risks, difficulties in accurately specifying or valuing desired innovations, and the risk of undercommercialization).
356
Pareto Optimality, SCIENCEDIRECT, https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/paretooptimality (last visited Aug. 16, 2021) (“Pareto optimality is the state at which resources in a given system are
optimized in a way that one dimension cannot improve without a second worsening.”).
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One limitation of the discussion below is that it does not recommend changes
to patent law, even as the previous Part acknowledged, the relevance of doctrines
like exhaustion, inventor remuneration, and inequitable conduct, to how the
benefits of innovation are distributed. One reason is that inequality is ruthlessly
practical—having to do less with legal rights on the books and more to do with
the gains to welfare as experienced in real life.357 Another reason is that the types
of innovation for which patents arguably matter the most, pharmaceuticals,
benefit from systemic certainty, rather than the case-by-case determinations
offered by equity. Perhaps for this reason, laws that require the evaluation of a
number of factors before suspending patents—for example, through the exercise
of march-in rights or compulsory licenses—have been used sparingly. A final
reason is that while agreeing on expanding equity and access in principle is easy,
working out the specifics of legal and administrative reforms requires detailed,
considered analysis beyond the scope of this Article.
For all of these reasons, this Article focuses below on the creation of the
institutional and administrative structures for increasing opportunity and access
in the patent system, leaving to them the more fulsome consideration of changes
to the law that would do the same. Specifically, this Article recommends: (1) to
increase opportunity to invent, creating an Independent Office of the Small
Inventor Advocate within the USPTO that would be responsible for increasing
invention capital and know-how among underrepresented and underserved
innovators, leveling up the inventing playing field, for example through patent
quality technology and rigorously evaluating policy suggestions such as the
creation of a patent small claims court; (2) to increase access, establishing an
Independent Office of the Public Interest and Partnerships to enhance public
understanding of the patent system and support partnerships to advance access;
and (3) to track progress in narrowing the inequalities of innovation, introducing
invention equity metrics.
*****

A. Expanding Opportunity to Innovate by Leveling Up the Patenting
Playing Field
The discussion below explores a few ideas for “leveling up” the patenting
playing field. These suggestions include, in the acquisition of patents, universal
access to patent quality technology, and in their enforcement, exploring a small

357
In the COVID-19 context, for example, schemes that waive rights, to many, are less meaningful than
schemes that actually accomplish the delivery of medicines.
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claims option, as well as working to build invention capital, and to carry out
these reforms, establishing an Independent Office of the Small Inventor
Advocate.
1. By Reducing the Success Gap in Patenting Through Patent-Quality
Technology
As described previously, first-time patenting is associated with increasing
economic mobility and other positive outcomes.358 For at least these reasons, it
is important to pay attention not only to who is applying for patents, but also to
what happens when they do. The rate at which firms “succeed” on their patent
applications is estimated to be around 71% on average,359 but how are firms that
are first-time applicants faring? Using data obtained from Google patents, I
previously traced patent applications by the size of the filer from the initial
application through its eventual resolution.360 I found, consistent with other
analyses,361 that among applications filed ten years ago, 73% of large entity
applications had matured into patents but only 51% of small or micro-entity
applications had.

358

See Farre-Mensa, supra note 181, at 642–43. See generally Aghion et al., Innovation and Top Income
Inequality, supra note 175.
359
Michael Carley, Deepak Hegde & Alan Marco, What is the Probability of Receiving a U.S. Patent?,
17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 203, 213 fig.3 (2015) (distinguishing between “family” and “progenitor” allowance rates
of 56% and 71%, respectively). Note that the 71% figure is an average of percentages of six different industries.
Id.
360
Colleen V. Chien, Jonathan Collins, Zachary J. Daly & Rodney Swartz, Guest Post: Advancing
Inclusive Innovation and Entrepreneurship Through the Patent System, PATENTLYO (Nov. 4, 2020) (reporting
on an analysis performed in October 2020 of Patent Examination Data System (PEDS) data of a random sample
of patent applications filed in 2010); Patent Examination Data System, USPTO, https://ped.uspto.gov/peds/#!/
(Aug. 15, 2021). It uses entity size at filing as the source of entity size data. See Office Action Research Dataset
for Patents, USPTO (last visited June 20, 2022), https://www.uspto.gov/ip-policy/economic-research/researchdatasets/office-action-research-dataset-patents.
361
Kate Gaudry & Sarah C. Brock, Patent Prosecution Statistics: Large Versus Small Entities, INTELL.
PROP.
TODAY
(Oct.
2014),
https://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/~/media/Files/articles/2014/Gaudry_OCT14%20V3.ashx
(“[S]mall
entities’ patent applications were 58% more likely to be abandoned than [those of] large entities.”); see also
Carley et al., supra note 359, at 214 (2015) (showing that small entity patent filers had lower rates of allowance
than large entity filers).
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Fig. 5: Patent Grant Rates by Entity Size

This means that in almost half of the cases, the applications submitted by
small entities do not actually turn into patents by the ten-year mark. Given the
importance of entrant applicant success, the USPTO should further investigate
the causes of this high failure rate, for example, through survey or other forensic
work. Small inventor attrition may be due to any of a variety of factors, such as
a higher firm failure or pivot rate, differences in the types of patents sought, the
merits of the underlying inventions, or less cash on hand.362 It may also stem
from the differences in the application experience alluded to in Part II leading to
low quality among applications submitted.363 A previous analysis has shown that
discounted (“small” and “micro”) entity applications are much more likely to
experience rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112, which requires that an invention
be adequately disclosed and precisely claimed.364 Small entity and independent

362
See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181,
193 (2008).
363
See supra Part II.
364
35 U.S.C. § 112; see also Colleen V. Chien, Rigorous Policy Pilots the USPTO Could Try, 104 IOWA
L. REV. ONLINE 1, 21 (2019) .
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inventor patents are also less likely to survive post-grant challenges.365 Because
a patent specification cannot be supplemented with additional information once
it has been filed, the failure to sufficiently disclose and describe the invention
can be fatal to the application. But for new entrants, it is not always easy to tell
what level of disclosure will pass statutory muster. In surveys, patent examiners
have identified mismatches between the claims, the “inventive concept,” and the
specification to pose the biggest problems.366
One way to level up the application playing field would be to ensure that
access to high quality patent tools are accessible to entrants and incumbents. 367
As described in previous work, technological tools are now available to help to
detect errors, point out weaknesses in applications, and even to draft patents. 368
But under-resourced and less sophisticated patent applicants are among the least
likely to have access to fee-based tools, particularly when they represent
themselves pro se.
To support independent inventors, small entities, and first-time filers, the
USPTO could work to make these tools available to all applicants. One model
is provided by the “IRS Free File program,” which provides low-income and
military families369 with free access to tax return filing software.370 If technology
firms agreed to extend the “small” or “micro” discounts available at the USPTO
of 50% and 75% to clients, or to provide the tools to applicants that qualify for
USPTO pro bono assistance, then tool adoption, equity, and applicant readiness
would all be boosted. Advanced market commitments, or other means of
coordinating, or aggregating demand would reduce uncertainty in the market.
365
Brian J. Love, Shawn P. Miller & Shawn Ambwani, Determinants of Patent Quality: Evidence from
Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 119 & n.217 (2019) (finding patents obtained by
small entities and independent inventors to be “significantly less likely to pass muster” in post-grant challenge
contexts and citing supporting prior research).
366
JIM DWYER & MARTY RATER, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., EXAMINERS PROVIDE THEIR VIEWS ON
PREPARED
APPLICATIONS:
APPLICATION
READINESS
SURVEY
16
(2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/QChat_Oct_12_2017.pdf (reporting on a survey of
examiners that asked about deficits in patent specifications). The survey rated “[h]aving claims that are solely
directed to the inventive concept” as having the largest gap among claims, while “[h]aving the inventive concept
clearly set forth” had the largest gap among specifications. Id.
367
See Chien, Rigorous Policy Pilots the USPTO Could Try, supra note 364, at 22–24.
368
Id.
369
IRS Free File Program Delivered by Turbotax, TURBOTAX, https://freefile.intuit.com/ (last visited
Feb. 26, 2021).
370
Though, in a way that takes into account problems in the administration of the Intuit FreeFile program.
See Justin Elliott & Lucas Waldron, Here’s How TurboTax Just Tricked You into Paying to File Your Taxes,
PROPUBLICA (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.propublica.org/article/turbotax-just-tricked-you-into-paying-to-fileyour-taxes (describing efforts by TurboTax to misleadingly direct taxpayers to the paid rather than free version
of its software).
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The same economic models that allow AARP, bar associations, and other loyalty
membership associations to provide these services to their members could be
used here. “Means-testing” could be accomplished through declarations made to
the USPTO of an applicant’s or patentee’s size that risk a finding of inequitable
conduct rendering the patent unenforceable if found to be false later.371
2. By Reducing the Enforcement and Defense Gaps Through a Patent Small
Claims Court?
Though the foregoing paragraphs focus on making it easier for small entities
and independent inventors to obtain patents, a similar approach could be applied
to make it easier for small entities to both enforce their patents and protect
themselves against claims of infringement. One way of doing so could be
through a “small claims” patent court that is designed to reduce the burden on
both small plaintiffs and defendants. For plaintiffs, the high cost of litigation and
the possibility of countersuits currently puts all but the best-resourced
patentholders at a disadvantage. For small defendants, the high cost of defense372
can also create a lose-lose situation, since:
[n]o matter what, a company that successfully defends against
a patent suit is left in a worse position than when it started. If
it has not spent money on damages, then it has spent money on
legal fees, making the objective to get out of the suit as cheaply
as possible.373
While the obvious upside of such a forum is, of course, that it could curb
opportunistic infringement by making it more likely that small plaintiffs will get
their day in court, there is a risk that the forum itself will result in opportunistic
assertion, resulting in a proliferation of cases against small defendants. The
adoption of possible features like capping costs based on the estimated value of
a case, requiring both parties to opt in, and enabling the pre-specification of
agreed-upon, arbitration-type remedies, may make it more likely that the
appropriate balance between under-enforcement and over-enforcement will be
struck.374 The use of some version of these features in the copyright system’s
emerging small claims court under the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims

371

37 C.F.R. § 1.28(d).
Collen V. Chien & Michael J. Guo, Does the U.S. Patent System Need a Patent Small Claims
Proceeding? 2 (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10–13, 2013),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2249896.
373
Id. at 5.
374
See id.
372
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Enforcement (“CASE”) Act,375 as well as private sector experiments like
Amazon’s Utility Patent Neutral Evaluation Procedure,376 both of which aim to
limit the cost of adjudicating patent claims, are likely to be instructive. In early
2022, the Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”), an
independent governmental agency, announced that it had been engaged by the
USPTO to conduct an independent study of issues associated with, and options
for designing, a small claims patent court, for ultimate submission to
Congress.377 But rather than trying to perfect a program on the first try, the
USPTO could build on its tradition of testing out promising programs by
“piloting” them temporarily378 to try to test the impact of a small claims court,
under the ambit of an Independent Office of the Small Inventor Advocate, as
described below.
3. By Increasing Invention Capital
But to even have a patent to enforce in the first place, or an innovation that
is worth fighting over, requires more than just good ideas—it also requires
exposure to relevant networks of support. With its rich administrative data, the
USPTO can help to build invention capital among invention outsiders and
traditionally underrepresented groups. For example, as the holder of information
on patent bar qualified agents and attorneys, the USPTO can make it easier to
find trusted and qualified legal help. Already, the USPTO maintains a public
listing of registered attorneys and agents for disciplinary purposes, 379 but this
could be supplemented with the fields of information provided on an opt-in basis
by practitioners including the last prosecuted patent, relevant technologies and
client types, and relevant affinity and professional groups. As businesses seek to
375
This operates as an opt-in forum. See Corit Henris, Oof! Nice Try Congress—The Downfalls CASE
Act and Why We Should be Looking to our Cousins Across the Pond for Guidance in Updating our New Small
Claims Intellectual Property Court, 29 U. GA. J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 196–97 (2021). The CASE Act of 2020
established an alternative to federal court for parties seeking resolution of low-value copyright disputes; it is
scheduled to begin operation in 2022. See generally Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of
2019, 17 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (stating that elements of the CASE Act serve as an alternative to federal court).
376
Also an opt-in system, under Amazon’s program, each party pays $4,000 for a neutral, Amazonappointed patent attorney to determine whether a product likely infringes a valid patent. The winning party gets
its money back, and the losing party’s money goes to the evaluator. If the evaluator finds infringement—or if
the alleged infringer does not participate—the product listing is removed and will only be reinstated after a court
order. Kaity Y. Emerson, From Amazon’s Domination of E-Commerce to its Foray into Patent Litigation: Will
Amazon Succeed as “The District of Amazon Federal Court”?, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 71, 89–92 (2019).
377
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS—FEBRUARY 3,
2022,
U.S.
PATENT
SMALL
CLAIMS
COURT
(2022),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO%20RFP%202022.02.03.pdf.
378
See Chien, Rigorous Policy Pilots the USPTO Could Try, supra note 364, at 2.
379
Vishnubhakat, supra note 315, at 73.
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diversify the attorneys they hire, for example demographically or
geographically, such information can help facilitate connections.
An existing literature suggests that “the gender gap in patenting,
entrepreneurial activities, and commercialization of inventions could be
mitigated by the intervention of mentors and role models.”380 As the holder of
information on patent applicants and holders, the USPTO can also facilitate
targeted connections through affinity or other inventor groups, 381 building, for
example, on its coordination work certifying intellectual property clinics at law
schools across the country. As of June 2021, the USPTO had certified 60
programs,382 servicing inventors across the country. The Office could play a
similar “coordination” or certification role in supporting additional pro bono law
or mentoring connections, for example, between intellectual property attorney
groups, like the American Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) or
Intellectual Property Owner (“IPO”), and affinity groups, like the National
Society of Black Engineers (“NSBE”). The USPTO could also facilitate
connections to other innovation resources offered by the government, such as
grants, innovation facilities, or other support. Finally, the Office may be able to
play an indirect role in boosting inclusion in commercial events, such as
conferences and workshops, where critical content and connections are often
made. For example, it could encourage conference providers to offer “small” or
“micro-entity” discounts or remote tracks, certifiable through filing status, for
reaching and including a larger set of people.383
The Office can also improve how it provides access to patenting know-how
and information. The USPTO already provides numerous resources on its
website to help members of the public learn about patents and patenting. 384 But
it remains difficult to navigate the site and find answers to basic questions about
how to get patents, find an attorney, and connect with help.385 A concerted effort
to build a front end to first-time and small inventors, for example, through a
380

Report to Congress Pursuant to P.L. 115-273, The SUCCESS Act, supra note 56, at 19.
Lisa Cook has recommended that the federal government facilitate remote mentorships through federal
labs. LISA D. COOK, POLICIES TO BROADEN PARTICIPATION IN THE INNOVATION PROCESS 15 (2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Cook_PP_LO_8.13.pdf.
382
USPTO to Expand Law School Clinic Certification Program, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (June 1,
2021), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-expand-law-school-clinic-certification-program-1.
383
See Colleen Chien & Ernest Fok, Comments to the National Strategy for Expanding American
Innovation, SANTA CLARA L. 1, 61 (2021), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/986/ (presenting
comments on boosting innovation through conference partnerships by Dalton Chasser).
384
See Learning and Resources, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/learningresources (last visited May 28, 2021).
385
See Chien & Fok, Comments to the National Strategy for Expanding American Innovation, supra note
383, at 18 (describing the difficulty of finding information on the USPTO website).
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dedicated website presence, like www.uspto.gov/inventor or inventor.gov, could
go a long way. The USPTO’s regional staff can further help to provide a “human
face” and connection to those seeking invention education, invention services,
and training about the patent system, and it would be worth quantifying and
scaling their impact—for example, leveraging the legions of patent examiners
that work remotely across the country. To house all of these “invention capital”building activities, this Article proposes an Independent Office of the Small
Inventor Advocate, discussed next.
4. Through an Independent Office of the Small Inventor Advocate
Many of the ideas above should not be controversial and, in fact, are not
completely new. Under Section 28 of the America Invents Act (“AIA”),
Congress created a Patent Ombudsman Program for small business concerns.386
But the ambit of the Program, which lacks independent funding, is narrow,
limited to providing support services relating to patent filings to small business
concerns and independent inventors.387 In practice, this means facilitating
complaint handling when applications become stalled in the examination
process, tracking complaints to ensure each is handled within ten business days,
and using inquiry trends to assess training needs for USPTO staff. The
Ombudsman Program so far has primarily worked in a ministerial capacity.388
A broader role—for example, overseeing the ideas described above—would not
necessarily fall into the responsibilities of the Program.
This Article proposes a different and more muscular model for supporting
small and underrepresented inventors—the creation of an Independent Office of
the Small Inventor Advocate. This Office would house the wide variety of
programs that the USPTO already has (such as its recently constituted Council
for Inclusive Innovation and Patent Pro Bono programs), administer new
programs for expanding invention capital, and engage in research and advocacy
on behalf of small inventors and innovators. Such an Office could be modeled
after existing Offices within the executive branch that are tasked with
safeguarding the interests of particular populations. One example is provided by
the Taxpayer Advocate Service (“TAS”) of the IRS, led by the National

386

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29 (Sept. 16, 2011).
Id.
388
See Anthony Knight, Patents Ombudsman Program, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 5 (available at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DYRU_OHCcJoYL8W01EfVDMeMmwpbErtJ/view) (last visited June 20,
2022) (identifying the top five inquiries by those using the program as (1) status inquiries, (2) filings, (3) case
prosecution concerns, (4) petitions, and (5) general questions).
387
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Taxpayer Advocate as appointed by the Secretary of Treasury. 389 The TAS was
created to help taxpayers resolve problems with the IRS, protect taxpayer rights,
reduce taxpayer burden, and encourage overall service improvement at the
IRS.390 But it started in a way that resembles the USPTO’s Ombudsperson
Program,391 when, “[i]n 1976[,] the IRS created . . . the problem resolution
program (PRP)[,] . . . endowing specially designated and more experienced
revenue agents and [Revenue Officers] with the discretion and independence to
help taxpayers . . . .”392 The program then expanded in 1979 to include a senior
management position, or the taxpayer ombudsman, to perform systemic
advocacy for taxpayers.393 In 1988, Congress codified the function of the
taxpayer ombudsman in “section 7811, in the Taxpayer Bill of Rights.”394 Then,
in 1998, Congress amended IRC section 7803(c), creating the National Taxpayer
Advocate (“NTA”) of today.395 To help ensure this independence, the NTA
reports only to the IRS commissioner.396
An important role of the NTA is to advocate for small taxpayers. A tribute
to long-standing NTA Nina Olson, who held the position for eighteen years,
credited her efforts—including annual reports and testimony to Congress, public
outreach, and professional engagement—all of which “advanced low-income
taxpayers’ rights,” “helped improve systemic rights and access to justice for all
federal taxpayers,” and “establish[ed] and strengthen[ed] state and local
taxpayer advocate and ombuds offices.”397 The TAS helps more than 200,000398
taxpayers per year399 and in fiscal year 2020, had an operating budget of over
$200 million.400
389

26 U.S.C. § 7803I(1)(B)(i)–(ii).
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat.
699(2)(A)(i)–(iv) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
391
Bryan T. Camp, What Good Is the National Taxpayer Advocate?, 126 TAX NOTES 1243, 1247 (Mar.
8, 2010).
392
Id.
393
Id.
394
Id.
395
26 U.S.C. § 7803(c).
396
Id. at §7803(c)(1)(B)(i).
397
Danshera Wetherington Cords, Tribute to National Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson, 18 PITT. TAX REV.
1, 7 (2020).
398
Roughly 240 million federal tax returns were filed in the 2020 fiscal year. See Returns Filed, Taxes
Collected & Refunds Issued, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/returns-filed-taxes-collected-and-refundsissued (last visited May 22, 2022).
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Louis DeNicola, What is the Taxpayer Advocate Service and What Does It Do?, CREDITKARMA (Dec.
21, 2020), https://www.creditkarma.com/tax/i/taxpayer-advocate-service.
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE:
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE REPORTS TO CONGRESS (2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-217.pdf.
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Another administrative model is offered by the Office of Advocacy of the
Small Business Association (“OASBA”), whose mission it is to be the
“independent voice” for small business within the federal government,401 by
intervening in regulatory processes, producing research to inform policy, and
“fostering a two-way communication between federal agencies and the small
business community.”402 The OASBA has reported that its rules have resulted
in first-year regulatory cost savings for small businesses of $3.2 billion in the
2021 fiscal year.403 Borrowing from these models, a few key ingredients of a
new Independent Office of the Small Inventor Advocate would be autonomy and
independence, an advocacy and research role, a clearly defined mission and set
of performance metrics, and dedicated funding and resources. Besides working
to close each of the patent grant, enforcement, and defense gaps, bolstering
invention capital, and coordinating pro bono support, such an Office could also
work closely with the inventor community to test and socialize upcoming
developments—like regulatory changes, changes to the Manual of Patent
Examination and Procedure (“MPEP”), and website revisions—and make
suggestions to Congress and the USPTO on matters accordingly.

B. Increasing Access and Accountability Through an Independent Office
of the Public Interest and Partnerships
To advance access to innovation through the patent system, this subsection
proposes the establishment of an Independent Office of the Public Interest and
Partnerships, to make the patent system more accountable to public interests and
to foster partnerships covering patented inventions. As described in Part II, while
the purpose of the patent system is to promote innovation, a broader set of legal
tools ranging from the oversight provisions of Bayh-Dole to antitrust law are
invested in increasing access to patented innovation along both the dimensions
of affordability and availability. In addition, as described, partnerships can
dramatically increase access to patented innovation by supporting both followon innovation, to adapt an innovation to a different use case or set of consumers,
and expanded innovation to new markets.
But the information costs associated with both exercising oversight and
finding out basic information about patents—for example, its projected
expiration date, who owns it, and whether someone is willing to license it—are
401
About—SBA’s Office of Advocacy, U.S. SBA OFF. ADVOC., https://advocacy.sba.gov/about/ (last
visited May 22, 2022).
402
ROBERT JAY DILGER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., SBA OFFICE OF ADVOCACY: OVERVIEW, HISTORY, AND
CURRENT ISSUES 1 (2022), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R43625.pdf; see also 15 U.S.C. § 634.
403
DILGER, supra note 402, at 11.
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high. The ability of generalists or members of the public to discern the status of
a particular patent application requires in-depth knowledge of patent procedure
and law to decipher what practices (e.g., prophetic examples) or options (e.g.,
continuations) have been taken in pursuit of a patent.404
The Executive Order on Competition issued by President Biden early in his
administration hints at both the broad interests in patents and a way around the
opacity and density of patent records.405 The Order directs agencies to take
action involving standards-setting processes that implicate the rights of patent
holders and implementers,406 and also to advance a broad set of public interests
in the use and potential misuse of patent law, with respect to seed and farm
inputs, generic drugs and biosimilars,407 and federally funded inventions.408 It
directs not only the USPTO, but also the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (“NIST”), Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”),
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), and Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”) to take action on various patent issues.
The collaboration between agencies contemplated in the Order highlights the
important role the USPTO can play in clarifying the patent record in a way that
advances the broader public interest. As it stands, the USPTO has been a model
in terms of “open data,” providing extensive data releases that have seeded a rich
body of empirical research and hundreds of patent open data companies.409 But
the complexity of the system also limits robust public debate and oversight,
especially in light of the silos between legal regimes that exist.
An Independent Office of Public Interest and Partnerships, similar to the
404

See Jorge L. Contreras, Shepardizing Patents, PATENTLY-O (June 16, 2021),
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Letter from Colleen V. Chien, Assoc. Professor L. & Brian J. Love, Assistant Professor L., to The
Hon. Michelle L. Lee, Under Sec. of Commerce (Feb. 12, 2016) (on file with author); Colleen V. Chien &
Reuben
Bauer,
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(last visited Aug. 18, 2021).
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Independent Office of the Small Inventor Advocate, could be tasked with
improving public understanding of the patent record. Such an Office could
support meaningful exchange with public agencies, public interest groups, and
others with interests in patents. Like statutory inspectors general (“IGs”), such
an Office could represent an independent, nonpartisan official within the federal
government.410 But unlike IGs, who have the broad mandate of preventing and
detecting waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement within federal departments
and agencies,411 the ambit of the ombudsperson could be narrow—to advance
public interests within the patent system by ensuring that the patent record is
accessible and accurately interpreted, to conduct research, and to recommend
improvements to both increase the comprehensibility of patent practices and the
patent record, as well as bolster partnerships and commercialization efforts more
broadly. The Office could potentially be housed within the Department of
Commerce, the departmental home of the USPTO, or potentially within the
USPTO, but, like the Independent Office of the Small Inventor Advocate,
remain independent from the USPTO.
Besides advancing public interests, the Independent Office of the Public
Interest and Partnerships could also address and support technology
commercialization, through voluntary patent partnerships as well as open-source
based models, for example, based on pledges and the identification of
technology whitespaces. One need not look any further than COVID-19 to
appreciate the importance of these alternative models for expanding access to
innovation. Merck and Pfizer have licensed patents over small molecule
lifesaving COVID-19 drug treatments through the Medicines Patent Pool
(“MPP”).412 The UN-backed MPP negotiates with patentholders for licenses and
then offers these licenses to qualified generic suppliers for providing products
to resource-poor nations.413 This scheme removes the risk for both buyers and
sellers of technology. Patentholders and product developers gain an effective
way of sharing their innovative products through voluntary licensing agreements
that provide them with the option of receiving a fair royalty and the peace of
mind that the licensee will produce quality generic versions of originator

410

See generally KATHRYN A. FRANCIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A PRIMER (2022), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45450 (providing an
overview of statutory Inspector General).
411
Id. at 1.
412
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(Nov. 16,
2021),
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products.414 Generic suppliers benefit from data exclusivity waivers and
technology transfers to help accelerate generic product registration, and avoid
the need to hold separate negotiations with multiple parties by bundling the
rights needed.415
Another promising development has been the deliberate development of a
patent-free COVID-19 vaccine by researchers in Texas in order to boost
widespread access to vaccines.416 An Independent Office of Public Interests and
Partnerships could work to ensure that technology “whitespaces” created by the
expiration of patents or pledge of patent rights are easily ascertainable and
visible to all, potentially working to create freedom of action through better
information about patent expiry and coverage. Such an office could also study
and make recommendations about how to improve patent notice through the
collection and dissemination of patent marking information, and more generally
supporting further commercialization through commercial transactions and
other forms of collaboration.
The suggestion to strengthen public interests and public access through an
Independent Office of Public Interests and Partnerships may seem rather modest
in light of the strong rhetoric on patents as tools of inequality.417 However,
public debate on many of the topics of controversy, including term and scope
extension through continuations practice and their costs and benefits, have been
limited by a lack of public understanding of the pros and cons, which could be
more thoroughly vetted by an independent office. Further, while the USPTO’s
mission is focused on serving the public’s interest in the quality examination of
patents and trademarks, it is currently no single agency’s responsibility to ensure
that the public interest in access to innovation is also served.

C. Measuring and Tracking Equity in Invention Through Invention Equity
Metrics
A final proposal for enhancing equity in innovation is through the

414

Id.
Id.
416
See Karen Brooks Harper, From Obscurity to a Nobel Prize Nomination: Houston Scientists
Acclaimed for Their Patent-Free COVID-19 Vaccine, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 10, 2022),
https://www.texastribune.org/2022/02/10/corbevax-texas-coronavirus-vaccine/ (describing the Corbevax
vaccine).
417
See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, How Intellectual Property Reinforces Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (July 14,
2013, 9:04 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/how-intellectual-property-reinforcesinequality/ (arguing that the United States’ intellectual property regime is a key contributor to societal
inequality).
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78

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:1

introduction of “innovation equity metrics,” a compilation of patent and other
data metrics that reflect equity in innovation. Systematic reporting of metrics
that reflect demographic (e.g., race, ethnicity, and gender), economic (e.g., large
vs. small entity vs. first-time), and geographic (e.g., rural, urban, suburban,
international) diversity can help to promote awareness of gaps and efforts to
narrow them, which are priorities of the Biden Administration. 418
To date, reporting on patents has tended to focus on the top 1% of patentors.
For example, for almost three decades, IBM has been awarded more patents than
any other entity.419 However, top and aggregate statistics leave many important
questions unanswered. Has patenting followed a “K-shaped recovery curve,”
with large companies doing well and small businesses languishing? Has female
patenting slowed disproportionately, matching the job losses420 and reduction in
publication output421 women have suffered? How concentrated are new grants?
An effort to collect and report trends that address the distribution of invention
could address these questions and reveal the impact of innovation in light of new
policy. Introducing invention equity metrics like these can help in setting general
policy direction and in evaluating innovation-specific policy efforts.
While the idea of tracking and reporting on the distribution of patenting and
patents may seem unrelated to the task of granting patents, it has strong statutory
and historical support.422 The second enumerated duty of the USPTO, after the

418
Alondra Nelson & Clarence Wardell III, An Update from the Equitable Data Working Group, THE
WHITE HOUSE (July 27, 2021) (quoting Exec. Order No. 13985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,009),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/blog/2021/07/27/an-update-from-the-equitable-data-workinggroup/ (describing the work of the White House Equitable Data Working Group whose charge is to “gather the
data necessary” to advance equity, including through the development, curation, and dissemination of equity
metrics across realms).
419
Press Release, Hugh Collins, IBM Tops U.S. Patent List for 28th Consecutive Year with Innovations
in Artificial Intelligence, Hybrid Cloud, Quantum Computing, and Cyber-Security, IBM (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://newsroom.ibm.com/2021-01-12-IBM-Tops-U-S-Patent-List-for-28th-Consecutive-Year-withInnovations-in-Artificial-Intelligence-Hybrid-Cloud-Quantum-Computing-and-Cyber-Security. IBM was also
first in 2022, but only by a few dozen patents. See Press Release, Harrity & Harrity, Harrity Analytics Releases
2022 Patent 300® List (Jan. 6, 2022), https://harrityllp.com/harrity-analytics-releases-2022-patent-300-list/.
420
Megan DiTrolio, The U.S. Economy Lost 140,000 Jobs in December. All Were Held by Women, MARIE
CLAIRE (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.marieclaire.com/career-advice/a35167076/job-loss-december-2020-women/
(documenting disparities in job losses in December 2020 and citing losses to female-dominant fields, like
education).
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Colleen Flaherty, Women Are Falling Behind, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/10/20/large-scale-study-backs-other-research-showing-relativedeclines-womens-research (summarizing small- and large-scale studies that show relative declines in women’s
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See 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (describing, under its “Power and Duties,” the USPTO’s “responsib[ility] for
the granting and issuing of patents and the registration of trademarks”).
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examination of patents and trademarks, is “disseminating to the public
information with respect to patents and trademarks.”423 Embracing this role as
part of the open data movement in government, the agency has released
numerous administrative datasets in flexible formats.424
The USPTO could follow the precedent established by other federal agencies
in using data metrics to address disparities.425 For example, HHS has described
data collection and monitoring as key facilitators in their work to reduce racial
and ethnic health disparities.426 Since 2011, the CDC has highlighted public
health reports that reduced disparities and inequalities.427 The paragraphs below
discuss how such approaches can be mapped to invention equity metrics and the
strengths and limitations of currently available data.
1. Does Patenting Reflect Innovation Entry or Increasing Firms’
Dominance? (Investing in Identity Efforts)
Based on the insight that firm and job churn are key drivers of productivity
and economic growth, a rich set of metrics has been developed to track “business
dynamism” and entry.428 The concern, backed by evidence, is that dominant
firms are crowding out new entrants and startup formation has slowed, in turn
slowing productivity growth while growing inequality.429 As described in Part
II, a startup’s first-ever patent and a large firm’s 1000th patent have different
implications for social welfare.430 While patenting by entrants supports

423

Id. at § 2(a)(2).
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Services Action Plan to Reduce Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities: A Commentary on Data Needs to Monitor
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HUMAN SERVS., ACTION PLAN TO REDUCE RACIAL AND ETHNIC HEALH DISPARITIES (2011) (setting an agency
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economic mobility, patenting by incumbents risks suppressing competition.431
Using USPTO data, I generated the share of patents granted each year to firsttime patentees. As shown in Appendix Figure 5, this data suggests that the share
of patent grants to entrants has dropped from 13% in 1990 to 7% in 2019, a
potentially worrisome trend.432
An analysis by Akcigit and Ates reported a similar general decline of over
50% in entrants’ share of patents over the period of reporting, 433 but the details
were different—the earlier analysis found a different base share of around 8%,
down to less than 4% in 2012.434 What explains the difference? The analysis
reported in this paper is based on the USPTO’s data, which reflects extensive
but imperfect name disambiguation efforts, while the Akcigit-Ates analysis adds
additional cleaning approaches. As a result, while both analyses show the same
general (downwards) trend in entry shares, the Akcigit-Ates view shows
continuous, year-over-year declines from 2010 to 2018, whereas my analysis
reflects that the decline has largely subsided in the post-2010 period. The quality
of the data matters and is worthy of greater priority and investment, in both the
characterization of past patenting and the collection of data for future tracking.
Improving the quality of existing data is a challenging but important task.
For determining whether an inventor is considered a “first-time patentee,” for
example, the USPTO could make this a category of small entity discount, with
applicants checking all the categories that apply. The USPTO could also ask a
voluntary question: “Is this the applicant’s first patent application?” The IDEA
Act introduced in the 116th Congress provides another model for data
collection.435 It directs the USPTO to collect demographic information,
including gender, ethnicity, national origin, sexual identity, veteran status,
disability, education, and income levels, which are currently not reported. 436 In
order to avoid any prejudice to the patentholder, the information would be kept
confidential and separate. The collection would be voluntary, raising selection
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issues that would need to be addressed.
Another way in which these innovation metrics can further equity is in the
evaluation and formulation of patent policy. For example, for a forthcoming
article, I track US and Canadian independent inventor activity in the period
before and after the AIA was passed, to test whether or not the AIA’s
introduction of a “first to file” regime to the United States led to a measurable
decline in participation by independent inventors, as was feared. 437 Taking
seriously policies meant to bolster equity means not only passing, but rigorously
evaluating such policies after they are enacted.
D. Enriching and Collecting Data to Track Inclusion
While the adoption of fee discounts is one example of an “inclusive
innovation” policy change, there are numerous others, both within the patent
system438 and outside of it, at the local, state, and federal and private-sector
levels.439 But it is often difficult to connect a policy to its target audience or
outcome, and therefore to evaluate its effectiveness. For example, in the case of
the Small Business Innovation Research (“SBIR”) program of the Small
Business Administration, although grantees are encouraged to patent, patent
activity is not reported.440 This is a missed opportunity to track the inventive
impact of funding on their targeted federal contractors: woman-owned
businesses and socially and economically disadvantaged businesses, including
businesses in historically underutilized business (HUBZones) districts441—and,
more importantly, to improve SBIR programs with this information. Likewise,
there has been little independent effort to analyze the downstream impact of the
AIA’s pro bono efforts in part because the USPTO has a policy of not disclosing
what applications have benefited from them.442 Shoring up the connections as
437
Colleen Chien, Redefining Progress as Diversity in Innovation and Inventorship 5, 11–12 (July 31,
2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
438
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439
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28, 2020), https://www.pivotalventures.org/newsroom/get-cities-city-based-initiative-increase-women-techunited-states-chicago-launch.
440
See Reports, SMALL BUS. INNOVATION RSCH., https://www.sbir.gov/reports (last visited Feb. 26, 2021)
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441
For an overview of the types of contractors targeted by the Small Business Administration, see
Contracting Assistance Programs, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/federalcontracting/contracting-assistance-programs (last visited Aug. 16, 2021). Some survey work on the patenting
behavior of SBIR applicants has been done. See, e.g., Reynold V. Galope, What Types of Start-ups Receive
Funding from the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program? Evidence from the Kauffman Firm
Survey, 9 J. TECH. MGMT. & INNOVATION 17, 18 (2014).
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well as the quality, consistency, and availability of data by collecting data on
first-time patenting and demographic fields, as discussed above, could go a long
way.443 So could efforts to release anonymized or aggregated information as
applications are being filed, rather than with the customary eighteen-month lag,
and444 the USPTO’s reporting of female invention in fulfillment of its
responsibilities under the Study of Underrepresented Classes Chasing
Engineering and Science (“SUCCESS”) Act445—as well as earlier related
reporting on the geographic and demographic qualities of inventors446—
demonstrate what is possible with a focus on equity.
CONCLUSION
In the summer of 2021, Jeff Bezos, the richest man in the world, flew into
space on a rocket that he personally funded.447 Shortly after returning from
space, he committed to giving $200 million to changemakers tackling topics like
tech equity.448 Bezos’s net worth at the time, $188 billion,449 was bolstered by a
reported tax rate of only 0.98% from 2014 to 2018.450
The questions of who participates in, profits from, and can access the fruits
of innovation are not only central to the issue of shared prosperity, but also the
Request F-20-00025) (on file with author).
443
See supra Section III.C.
444
35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (specifying default publication eighteen months after a patent application, which
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diversity of problems that receive attention and solutions that get elevated. In a
market economy, the market decides, but law and policy shape the market. This
Article has divided the concept of inequality into three distinct subtypes with
relevance to innovation—inequality of wealth, inequality of opportunity to
innovate, and inequality of access to innovation. It eschews more onedimensional accounts that tend to portray patents simply as tools of inequality
or prosperity—they can be both, and the context and the institutional details
matter. An inequalities framework provides a way to talk about the different
dynamics and tensions at stake, but also the distinct regulatory levers that are
available to shift the balance towards greater equity in innovation. Application
of such an approach to other types of intellectual property may have similar
benefits.
At bottom, patent law’s fundamental role remains to “promote the progress,”
stimulating the creation of wealth and innovation that all can benefit from. It can
do that in an equitable way, as discussed in Part III, by prioritizing the
development of “invention capital”—including the social capital of who you
know and can call on—among underrepresented groups, stimulating greater
participation in inventing and entrepreneurship. It can also ensure that
opportunities to get patents are equal, by investing in patent education and
quality tools and attending to the needs of small inventors. It can support equity
in innovation more broadly by centering and measuring equity and entry, as well
as enhancing public interests in patent law by improving public understanding
of the patent system and promoting partnerships.
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Classes calculated based on matching the first IPC/CPC to technology sectors
as shown based on the following source: Ulrich Schmoch, Concept of a
Technology Classification for Country Comparisons: Final Report to the
World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO, 9 tbl.2 (2008)).
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Fig. 5: Share of New Patents to Entrants (Datasource: PatentsView)

